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Oliver Hensengerth
Transitions of Cambodia: War and Peace, 1954 to the present
Project Working Paper No. 2
Social and Political Fractures after Wars: Youth Violence in Cambodia and Guatemala
The present study is part of the research project on “Social and Political Fractures after 
Wars: Youth Violence in Cambodia and Guatemala”. The project is financed by the 
German Foundation for Peace Research and is located at the Institute for Development 
and Peace at the University of Duisburg-Essen. The project aims at explaining different 
levels of youth violence in two post-war societies whose processes of war termination 
are regarded as successful. However, both societies face serious problems of post-war 
development that are closely related to the experiences of war and war termination. 
While Cambodia’s democratisation process is considered more or less as a failure, Gua-
temala suffers from levels of violence higher than during most of the war. The differ-
ences between both countries in levels of violence and mechanisms of violence control 
are also visible in the incidence of youth violence. 
The project aims to explain these differences through the contextualisation of youth vio-
lence. Thus the main focus is directed at the societal and political fractures war and war 
termination cause for youth and their life-worlds. The working hypotheses were related 
to differences according to a) the levels of social differentiation; b) the relationship be-
tween political and economic power; c) normative frameworks; and d) the sequencing 
of post-war developments (namely between liberalisation and stabilisation). This ap-
proach has methodological consequences insofar as different levels of youth violence 
are what we seek to explain. The perspective of the actors themselves is beyond our ap-
proach. After having identified the relevant fractures this would be the task of further 
research.
The present study elaborates the historical frame for the analysis of post-war youth vio-
lence by looking at longitudinal developments as well as fractures caused by war, vio-
lence, and the intersections of domestic and external developments in the triple trans-
formation processes under the liberal peace paradigm that was transplanted to Cambo-
dia during the UN peacekeeping mission. Starting with Cambodia at the time of inde-
pendence from France in 1953/54, the study analyses Cambodia’s social, economic, and 
political development, its fractures and long-term processes during the successive stages 
of the war and post-war periods. The study looks at patterns in Cambodia’s develop-
ment and aims to explain Cambodia’s difficult post-war situation not merely as a back-
slide into war, but rather as a development that partly continues, partly fractures tradi-
tional facets of Cambodia’s social and political development.
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Transitions of Cambodia: War and Peace, 1954 to the present
This study is concerned with the social and economic developments in Cambodia between 
1954 and today. For most of its part, the conflict was a political rather than social conflict 
fought between the elites of various parties and political colour, among them Sihanouk and 
the republican opposition in the Democratic Party, the right-wing and US leaning military 
under Lon Nol, the communists, Ranariddh and Hun Sen. The communists were initially nur-
tured and raised by Vietnam’s communists, then developed a nationalist branch under Pol Pot 
and eventually broke apart in pro and anti-Vietnamese parties after 1978. 
The Cambodian crisis started in 1968 when the communists, which Sihanouk had labelled the 
Khmer Rouge, launched a national campaign. A first nation-wide campaign in 1967, which 
originated in the Samlot rebellion of the same year, had failed. The 1968 campaign was first a 
struggle between Sihanouk and the communist opposition that had been entirely driven un-
derground, but developed into a full-scale civil war. Under the influence of the contempora-
neous Vietnam War, the domestic conflict became internationalised and, hence, found its le-
gitimisation largely on the basis of the Cold War dichotomy. While the Cold War structured 
the crisis primarily, historical interests of neighbouring states in the region utilised the conflict 
in order to achieve old desires towards dominating Cambodia (China versus Thailand versus
Vietnam) by supporting appropriate internal parties.
In order to avoid the trappings of culturalist explanations of violence, the author would like to 
state that violence may be a result of the war, a feature of Cambodia’s political culture inde-
pendent of the war, or simply executions of personal revenge between (former) friends or 
neighbours. Regional and local disparities need to be taken into account as well, in order to 
avoid generalisation of the entire Cambodia without reference to differing incidents of vio-
lence, the form of violence, the degree of social differentiation, and the recent political history 
of different regions. For instance, between 1975 and April/May 1978, the Eastern Zone of the 
Khmer Rouge state was governed by moderate communists, which were friendly towards 
Vietnam and did not share the ideological zeal of the Khmer Rouge hardliners under Pol Pot. 
Accordingly, political violence in the form of corvée labour or executions occurred far less 
than, for instance, in the Central Zone. Also, it should be noted that a number of poorest peas-
ants benefited from the social and economic policies of the Khmer Rouge, which designed the 
Cambodian economy to become an agrarian subsistence economy based on rice.
This is to say that the Cambodian communists were not a concrete bloc without fissures. In 
1978, when the moderates fled to Vietnam to escape Pol Pot’s purges, the party broke apart. 
The escapees returned in 1979 together with the Vietnamese army and ousted Pol Pot’s com-
munists. After the civil war had officially ended in 1991, Pol Pot established a base at the 
Thai border, which proved to be hostile soil for the nominally socialist Heng Samrin/Hun Sen 
government. This remained the case until 1999, when the last of former Pol Pot allies was 
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turned over to the government. Pol Pot had died the year before in April 1998. Until then, 
Cambodia was in effect partitioned between the Western parts of Battambang province under 
Pol Pot’s forces and the rest of the country in command of Hun Sen’s government in Phnom 
Penh. We should therefore keep in mind that for more than twenty years between the early 
1970s, when the communists established their first ‘liberated areas’, up to 1999, different re-
gions in Cambodia were experiencing different contemporaneous developments, ranging from 
a Pol Pot version of Maoism to a laissez faire economic liberalism, or, indeed, were experi-
encing a legal vacuum.
It is the purpose of this study to trace the socio-economic conditions for Cambodia’s civil war 
in order to supplement the vast literature that has explored the domestic and international are-
nas so well. Then, the study proceeds to discuss intersections of war and post-war transforma-
tions rather than viewing Cambodia’s post-1993 development as a simple backslide into war. 
We therefore look at concurrences between actors and structure (the triple transformation 
process of democratisation, market reforms and pacification) as consequence of the failed 
implementation of the liberal peace paradigm that surrounded the UNTAC mission of 1992-
1993. The Sihanouk years between 1954 and 1970 will make the start.
1. Pre-war Society: The Sihanouk years, 1954-1970
1.1. Economy and social differentiation
Between 1954 and 1966, Sihanouk’s popularity was widely unchallenged among the rural 
population, which kept a deferential air towards him and believed that ‘the government was 
out there’ (Chandler 1991:88). There were no famines, almost all peasants owned the land 
they tilled – a difficulty the communists faced (Chandler 1991:108), there was a sufficiency 
of land to cultivate, towns offered employment. Exports of primary products such as rice, 
rubber and pepper earned enough foreign exchange, aid from France, the United States and 
the Sino-Soviet bloc contributed to the erection of hospitals, schools, a deep-water port, and a 
road between Phnom Penh and the coast. Health care and sanitation improved fast, incidents 
of malaria and child mortality decreased as did illiteracy (Chandler 1991:89). 
The peasantry revered Sihanouk, and most peasants owned some land enough ‘for a family 
farm unit.’ However, the penetration of a tax collection system under French rule, and corvée 
labour and usury weighed heavily on the peasants, and money was mostly owed to Chinese 
and Sino-Khmer moneylenders (Kiernan 1986:xv+323). Commerce was dominated by Chi-
nese and Sino-Khmer, who resided in or near market and port towns (Kalab 1968:523). Even 
though the farming families who did not own land and earned their livings as tenants and 
sharecroppers increased from 4 percent to 20 percent between 1950 and 1970, the figures are 
low, whereby the middle half of the farming population owned roughly half of the cultivated 
land. Furthermore, landlordism never created a significant social problem, even though Pol 
Pot stressed this factor (Kiernan 1986:xv). However, while Ebihara (1987) warned against 
overstating the debt situation of peasants, Kiernan argued that almost all peasants had prob-
lems with repaying debts or obtaining credits ‘since money was usually lent at 12% interest 
per month, and credit available from rural shopkeepers (overwhelmingly Chinese and Sino-
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Khmer) returned 10 to 20% per month’ (Kiernan 1987:xv). Citing three surveys conducted 
between 1952 and 1966, this affected 75 percent, 50 percent and 67 percent of the peasants 
respectively (Kiernan 1986:xv). Today, landlessness is measured at different rates depending 
on the source: Chan Sophal, Tep Saravy and Sarthi Acharya (2001:ii) locate it between 12 and 
15 percent after consulting a number of sources for their study; the Economist, quoting World 
Bank numbers, locates it at 20 percent with a tendency towards a worsening situation as land 
grabbing of officials and private firms increase and the legal situation for land titles is un-
clear.1
To the detriment of the communist party, this situation did not provide fertile ground for revo-
lution. In 1950, Cambodia’s communists were almost exclusively composed of Vietnamese 
Khmer such as Son Ngoc Minh, Sieu Heng, Tou Samouth, and Chan Samay, who was born in 
Cochin China, known in Cambodia as Kampuchea Krom. All these men attended a meeting at 
Hatien close to the Cambodian border with Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Than Son, who was in 
charge of the Viet Minh’s foreign affairs committee in Southern Vietnam (Nam Bo). The aim 
was to chart a course for Cambodia’s revolution under Vietnamese guidance. During the 
meeting, Son fatalistically noted that in Cambodia, communists were operating in an ideo-
logical no man’s land: the key ingredients to attract following for a revolution – an exploita-
tive landlord class, a bourgeoisie, and a shortage of land – ‘were absent or poorly developed’, 
the peasantry ‘autarchic and resistant to outside pressure.’ Yet, in the words of Nguyen Than
Son, they were ‘the most unhappy and numerous class, in the regions furthest from the cities 
and bodies of water. This social class lives in the blackest of misery. They awake slowly but 
surely. They constitute the principle force of the Khmer revolution.’ While the peasantry was 
‘diffuse, autarchic, and asleep’, an urban proletariat was widely absent since the French fo-
cused their economic activities on Vietnam; the small intellectual class was loyal to the repub-
lican Democratic Party; and apart from the sangha, there was no communal organisation. It is 
estimated that forty ethnic Khmer were part of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1950 
(Chandler 1991:48-49).
Under French rule, a small middle class emerged in the urban areas consisting of business 
people and French-educated intellectuals. Soon, the latter found themselves in opposition to 
the conservatism espoused by the royalty and colonialists alike (Kiernan 1986:18-20). This 
dispute between the urban intellectual elite and the conservatism of Sihanouk found its mani-
festation in the attempts by Sihanouk to crush the influence of the Democratic Party. 
Social distinctions consisted of three broad classes: an upper class made up of royalty and 
high government officials; a middle class of white-collar workers, professionals, minor bu-
reaucrats etc.; and a lower class of peasants, workers, and artisans. Ebihara notes that finer 
distinctions were drawn within these classes, such as the peasants. Distinctions here were ac-
cording to the prosperity of a family, which depended on the size of paddy owned (Ebihara 
1987:20). Nevertheless, material wealth was not the actual determinant of status in the village 
community. Rather, prestige was owned on the basis of immaterial qualities: age, religiosity, 
or good character. Connected to this is the importance of religion. The Buddhist pagoda was a 
1 The Economist 10 March 2007:38; Human Rights Watch 1 August 2006.
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‘moral, social and educational center’ and monks seen as living embodiments of morality. 
The workings of karma had an important influence on individual behaviour with the aim to 
earn merit: becoming a monk; making donations to the pagoda; attending ritual observances 
at the pagoda; following Buddhist norms (Ebihara 1987:20-21). Sihanouk’s Sangkum party 
used the idea of karma in order to achieve compliance from the peasantry. In lockstep with 
rural admiration for the social and religious benefits the pagoda extended, a link between poli-
tics and religion emerged that was able to exercise social control over the peasantry. 
In the rural areas, literacy and further education were a service of the local pagodas. While 
boys entered the monastery and acquired at least basic literacy, women were generally illiter-
ate (Kalab 1968:532-533). Under French rule, the introduction of secular state schools began 
to eat away the influence of the monasteries in education, a development which extended to 
other functions such as financial help (banking), medical advice, and architectural assistance 
(Kalab 1976:67). Under Sihanouk’s rule, the education sector expanded rapidly. By 1970, 
nearly all Khmers could acquire basic literacy. 11,000 students attended university. This, 
however, produced social mobility and frustration as more and more segments of the popula-
tion became better informed, and radical interpretations of Cambodia’s society became fre-
quent (Chandler 1991:122-123). This was also an important factor in the alienation of espe-
cially urban youth with the Sihanouk state: only a few educated youth could find qualified 
employment in the undeveloped economy (see the map below for economic activity). As the 
urban youth and intellectuals were no longer receptive for traditional hierarchy and the politi-
cal symbolism of Sihanouk’s kingship, the gap widened between the young educated elite and 
the Sihanouk state.2
Starting in 1963, the situation deteriorated. When Sihanouk stopped reception of US aid in 
1963, aid was the equivalent of 16 percent of GNP.3 To replace the loss of US aid, Sihanouk 
nationalised banking, foreign trade and the insurance sector under the policy of Buddhist so-
cialism in 1963. This provided the circle around Sihanouk with means of patronage in a crony 
socialism of state monopolies. By 1966, the economic situation had become desperate, seeing 
falling foreign investment, rising inflation, and the main export product rice sold to commu-
nist troops in Vietnam, which deprived the state of much needed revenue (Isaacs et. al. 
1987:85). Shadow economy structures therefore became a challenge to the authority of the 
government. Chinese and Sino-Khmer merchants in towns and to a lesser degree also peasants 
profited from the illegal sale of rice and other food to communist insurgents. Those transport-
ing this food and weapons from the shipments to Sihanoukville also made money as did offi-
cers of the Cambodian army, who were allowed to skim off 10 percent of military aid chan-
nelled through Sihanoukville. Rice exports dropped from 583,700 tons in 1965 to 199,049 
tons in 1966.4
2 Kiernan 1986:xiii-xiv and ibid.:xiv cited Nepote 1979:784; Chandler 1991:122-123.
3 Hood and Ablin 1987:xxii; Chandler notes 14 percent for the period 1960-1962, an amount that balanced the 
Cambodian budget:  131.
4 Isaacs et. al. 1987:85; Chandler 1991:140+145.
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Map: Land Use and Economic Activity in 1972 (or 1969)
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/cambodia_land_1972.jpg
Sihanouk was now making enemies on the left and the right: the urban middle class which 
resented corruption and cronyism, the military due to budget cuts, the civil servants due to 
absence of bribes to supplement their incomes, high school and university graduates for 
whom it was harder than before to find acceptable jobs in the deteriorating economy, the 
commercial classes including the Chinese and Sino-Khmer communities with their links to 
the capitalist economies in Saigon and Bangkok, and intellectuals some of whom fled to 
France or joined the communists. Between March and May 1967, revolts erupted in Samlot in 
Battambang province but spread across the whole country, first affecting the southern prov-
inces of Pursat, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Speu, Kampot, and the cen-
tral province of Kampong Thom. The following map shows areas with communist activity (as 
of 1955). 
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Map: Red or Pink Districts of Kampuchea, 1955
Source: Map taken from Kiernan, 1987: 163. Original source: ‘Red’ or ‘Pink’ Districts of Kampuchea, 1955, in: 
Norodom Sihanouk, ‘Le Communisme au Cambodge,’ in: France-Asie, 1958. 
Samlot marks the beginning of Cambodia’s civil war. The reasons were manifold and the vio-
lence, as Kiernan argued, was ‘initiated by the authorities’ (Kiernan 1986:251), who linked 
the crushing of the popular discontent to the crushing of leftist activities: communists reacted 
to increased government repression executed by Prime Minister Lon Nol and authorised by 
Sihanouk in February 1967; students radicalised against authority (teachers, monks, officials) 
influenced by the Cultural Revolution in China, which reached its height in June 1967; peas-
ants were infuriated at the government policy of having soldiers forcefully collecting rice 
from the peasants at one-third of black market prices in order to reverse the illegal selling of 
rice (in the wake of the campaign, the Chinese middlemen in the illegal selling of rice were 
arrested); others were angry at the state subsidies peasants received who were resettled there
in 1965-1966 in an attempt to give landless peasants and refugees from South Vietnam plots 
to grow crops; yet others were enraged by land grabbings of local officials and business men 
to expand cotton fields for a nearby textile company; many cotton farmers then ended up in-
debted as the cotton harvest of 1966 was poor. The land titles needed to plant the cash crops 
onto the fields of the traditional subsistence village communities were gained by paying the 
relevant officials in the Department of Property Licences. To crush the uprising, which was a 
mix of leftist reaction to increasing government repression and local discontent, the govern-
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ment sent eight battalions of soldiers to the area including ‘militia units of enthusiastic vigi-
lantes’ from Battambang.5 Demonstrations in Phnom Penh in March 1967 by students and 
monks against the wave of repression against communists met with threats by Sihanouk not to 
overstretch his goodwill vis-à-vis the left (Kiernan 1986:252). 
We can see here the penetration of the capitalist economy (cotton production) into the subsis-
tence village economy, plus the penetration of the power of the central state by way of gov-
ernment executed violence (rice collection) into the formerly insulated village communities. 
In addition, the link between business and politics is interesting, since, as we shall see, today 
evictions of peasants and shanty town people from the land they live on or work happen in an 
alliance between the government administration and firms, among them property developers 
and logging firms. Today, Prime Minister Hun Sen ensures much of his local support through 
his contacts to business people, who deliver the goods (roads, hospitals etc.), which he prom-
ises to the villagers if they vote for the correct party (i.e. Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s 
Party (CPP)).
The consequence of Samlot was that during his short tenure in office between 1966 and 1967, 
Prime Minister Lon Nol became extremely unpopular among the peasantry, which resented 
the cheap prices the government paid for the rice crop.6 When the revolt accelerated, villages 
were destroyed, peasants killed, and many fled to the forest with their wives and children led 
by their monks from the local pagoda.7
While Samlot showed rural discontent and increasing nation-wide organisational capacities of 
the communists, the urban areas were not calm either. Since the 1950s, students along with 
the sangha and intellectuals had been among those most critical of Sihanouk. However, since 
the crushing of the Democratic Party in 1957, students and intellectuals had no political home. 
In this sense, the student revolts in Siem Reap in February 1963, which escalated around cor-
ruption and nepotism in police and government, signalled the end of Sihanouk’s fast eroding 
urban support. His royal air of unity and morality quickly evaporated in the latter half of the 
1960s amidst corruption and cronyism, but he remained popular among the peasantry, who 
continued to rever him as their king and protector of the sangha, which had considerable 
moral influence in the villages. The communists used Sihanouk’s popularity among the peas-
antry to recruit them into their armies against the despised Lon Nol and, by extension, Siha-
nouk whom the Pol Pot faction within the communist party was set to oust once they would 
not need him anymore.
5 Chandler 1991:164-165; Kiernan 1986:249-268; for the rice problem see Kiernan 1986:251; Hughes 2001:24 
cited Frieson 1994:37.
6 Before he overthrew Sihanouk in 1970, Lon Nol held various governmental positions at different times, 
among them defense minister and army commander. Towards the end of Sihanouk’s reign, he served twice as 
prime minister: from October 1966 to May 1967, and again from August 1969 to March 1972. He was presi-
dent of the Khmer Republic from March 1972 to April 1975, when the Khmer Republic fell to the Khmer 
Rouge.  
7 Kiernan 1986:257; Chandler 1991:122, 145, 157-167 and Isaacs et. al. 1987:86.
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1.2. Forms of political governance
The village was the lowest level of administration with a village chief, who was elected by the 
local community. The next higher levels were the subdistrict, the district, province, and cen-
tral government. The village chief, his deputy, and two assistants passed on orders and poli-
cies from above and turned taxes, statistics and records on marriage, property transactions etc. 
through to the levels above. The subdistrict chief was a local resident elected by the adult 
population of the communities in the subdistrict. He had functions similar to that of the vil-
lage chief but was also a mediator in disputes and also was an intermediary between the local 
and national administration through his contacts in the district office. The district office was 
headed by an appointee of the national government.8 This introduced a barrier between the 
local residents here and the government out there. 
This had consequences for the ways in which conflicts were managed: national law was 
avoided in favour of informal ways, which employed local leaders as mediators instead (see 
the section on social cohesion in this chapter). The village was further linked to the national 
administration through the elected representative in the parliament. Since during Sihanouk’s 
time all candidates fared better as members of the Sangkum (since those who were not were 
intimidated into relinquishing the candidacy), their election depended on their interest in local 
issues, such as the construction of a medical centre (Kalab 1968:529). The monastic admini-
stration was structured parallel to the secular administration, and often both worked together. 
For instance, monastic teachers had their nominations countersigned by the governor and the 
mekon, the provincial monastic head, i.e. the religious counterpart of the governor: ‘The 
Cambodian nation is likened to a chariot supported on two wheels, one of which is the State 
and the other religion; only if both of them turn at the same speed can the chariot advance.’9
As Kalab notes, ‘grass-roots politics were in the hands of the influential monks in the vil-
lages’ (Kalab 1976:66). Consequently, political ‘legitimacy stems mostly from the sangha, 
which is in turn honoured and protected by the powerholder’ (Thion 1987:152). 
The role of protector of the sangha was performed by Sihanouk until his deposition in 1970. 
This role was an important part in the adoration of Sihanouk particularly by the rural popula-
tion, a fact which outlasted the Khmer Rouge cataclysm. The eclipse of the political power of 
the sangha during 1975-1978/79 and the reinstating of monks into positions of power and 
prestige after 1979 bears significance for the continued adoration of Buddhism and the influ-
ence monks had among the population. Thus it seems the post-1979 government seized on the 
continued importance of religion in people’s lives and sought political legitimacy by returning 
the sangha to position of influence – albeit under the control of the new socialist government 
headed by Heng Samrin. 
As a constitutional monarch, Sihanouk was ‘the paramount symbol of unity’ with ‘his actions 
mainly directed to ritual observance of an elaborate religious protection of the kingdom’
(Thion 1987:153). So he abdicated in 1955, made his father king, and assumed the title of 
Prince. In preparation for the elections to be held in 1955, he formed his own party, the Sang-
8 Ebihara 1987:19; Kalab 1968:529-530.
9 Kalab 1968:532; Kalab 1976:65-66.
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kum Reastr Niyum (People’s Socialist Community, short Sangkum). With it he defeated all 
parties, which opposed him: Son Ngoc Thanh’s left-wing Khmer Independence Party, the 
Democratic Party with its urban intellectual following, and the Pracheachon Party. The 
Pracheachon Party was a legal political party formed by the harassed communists but was 
eclipsed in the 1958 elections. The Sangkum won all seats for the National Assembly in the 
1955 elections, and Sihanouk became prime minister. The strength of the Democratic Party in 
the political system between 1946 until the 1955 elections for a while carried the hope of a 
democratic system independent of systems of patronage and elite politics. Its support was not 
dependent on traditional relations of patronage, but their supporters from Phnom Penh down 
to the village level were joined by ‘literacy, shared excitements, and the notion of a new, 
imagined community.’ The party attacked nepotism and corruption and in the 1940s clashed 
with the French owing to demands for full independence (Chandler 1991:38). The death of 
the Democratic Party also marked the death of hopes for a liberal, pluralist democracy in 
Cambodia. As Thion argued: ‘The French parliamentary tradition […] had no chance to graft 
itself onto the Khmer body politic except for a short period in 1955 with the rise of the De-
mocrat party, which was aborted when Sihanouk stepped down’ (Thion 1987:154). The con-
sequence of this is that among the urban elite, which perceived the legitimacy of rule to mate-
rialise from democratic elections rather than from the cosmology of Buddhist kingship, Siha-
nouk had no solid support base. 
The reasons for this is that the run up to the 1955 elections came to mark the Sihanouk years 
until 1970: politically motivated killings, intimidation, arrests without trials, censorship and 
absolute control over the media and the security forces ‘to cow people into inaction’ (Chan-
dler 1991:81-84, 90-98). The Sangkum, a conservative amalgamate with a few left-wing poli-
ticians to balance against the right, espoused a conservative version of Buddhism, which ex-
plained social inequalities through the workings of karma. It requested the poor to be obedient 
in order to gain better karma for the next life (Thion 1987:151+152).
The start of the Sangkum government was relatively efficient with the traditional factionalism 
muted. The economic programme included infrastructure projects financed through interna-
tional aid: a new airport for Phnom Penh funded by France, a road between Phnom Penh and 
the sea funded by the United States, and increased expenditures for education (Chandler 
1991:86). In March 1956, Sihanouk introduced a policy of Khmer socialism, later changed to 
Buddhist socialism. The idea behind this was to 
“perpetuate the status quo … based on an idealistic reading of Cambodia’s social relations. To 
make it work, Sihanouk counted on the deference of ordinary people and the good will of more 
fortunate Khmers. The system involved state intervention in many areas of life, while agricul-
ture and commerce remained in private hands, expanding educational facilities, and hoping for 
the best (Chandler 1991:87).”
To do this, Sihanouk had to balance between the political right and left in order to emerge 
victorious over both, hence creating unity beyond everyday political factionalism. In a way, 
this approach to domestic policy was mirrored by his non-aligned foreign policy. From the 
mid-1950s on, Sihanouk sought good relations with China, North Vietnam and the United 
States. Sihanouk, however, remained suspicious of US intentions in Cambodia. Military co-
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operation with the United States provided Washington with influence on Cambodian politics 
through the right-wing officers in the Cambodian army led by Lon Nol, Sihanouk’s former 
ally in the ‘Croisade Royale pour L’Indépendance.’ In 1963, Sihanouk stopped reception of 
US aid and broke off relations in 1965. In 1965, he allowed the North Vietnamese army and 
the Viet Cong to set up bases on Cambodian territory. Since 1964, China and the Soviet Un-
ion had been allowed to use the port of Sihanoukville for military shipments to Vietnam. 
While both China and North Vietnam were thus prevented to support Cambodia’s commu-
nists, the Cambodian elite benefited highly from this by pocketing money particularly from 
China, which bought rice from the Cambodian government at extravagant prices (Hood and 
Ablin 1987).
In 1967, the year of the Samlot rebellion, Sihanouk turned back to the United States indicat-
ing that he would not oppose US and South Vietnamese air and ground strikes against the 
Vietnamese communist troops in Eastern Cambodia, from where the Cambodian communists 
began a national insurgency in January 1968. Thus began the Operation Menu in March 1969 
(the so-called ‘secret bombing’ of Cambodian territory), which was to last until May 1970. 
In June 1969, full diplomatic relations between the United States and Cambodia were re-
stored. This turn to the United States had three reasons: one was the Cultural Revolution in 
China, which radicalised China’s foreign policy in support of the Khmer Rouge; another was 
the strong North Vietnamese presence in Eastern Cambodia, which threatened to destabilise 
Cambodia politically and economically; a third was that the losses of US aid were being felt 
overwhelmingly in the national budget. In addition, with the political left now underground 
and the national campaign of Cambodia’s communists, Sihanouk brought Lon Nol, who had 
long since demanded the withdrawal of Vietnamese communist troops from Cambodia, back 
into the government, first as defence minister in 1968, and as prime minister in 1969 to head 
the Government of National Salvation. 
Thus, while desperately trying not to ally himself to either quarter in the Cold War domesti-
cally and internationally, Sihanouk was squeezed internally from two diametrically opposed 
sides: by the left and the conservative and US-backed Prime Minister Lon Nol. Since the left 
opposition had been entirely driven underground after Sihanouk’s turn to the right and the 
arrest of the leftist leaders in the counter government10, Sihanouk had no means anymore to 
manoeuvre between them and the political right.
10 Sihanouk had formed a ‘counter government’, a form of shadow cabinet, which included his own followers 
and leading leftist politicians. The aim was to restrain Lon Nol, who had become prime minister after the 
elections to the National Assembly in September 1966, which saw a conservative majority. Lon Nol resigned 
in April 1967, and Sihanouk replaced him with the centrist Son Sann.  
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Map: U.S. Airstrikes in the Menu Series
Source: Etcheson, 1984: 102. 
1.3. Social cohesion
This was the situation at the end of Sihanouk’s reign: in the urban areas, a republican and to 
some extent also left-leaning urban youth combined with republican and left-wing intellectu-
als in strong anti-Sihanouk sentiments; a business elite which suffered under the deteriorating 
economic situation after Sihanouk’s break with the United States in 1963; a right-wing army 
attached to Lon Nol was looking to the United States for support and detested Sihanouk’s 
non-aligned foreign policy and time-to-time cooperation with urban leftist before they were 
completely driven underground in the aftermath of Samlot and joined their communist com-
patriots in the countryside. 
In the rural areas, communists radicalised under Pol Pot’s growing influence in the commu-
nist party; the peasantry, hostile to Lon Nol, revered Sihanouk as protector of the poor and 
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thought to find relieve in the communists’ appeal for better times while escaping Lon Nol’s 
army into the areas under influence of the communists. 
By 1970, Sihanouk had lost the grip over the various urban political factions. The commu-
nists, driven underground, were beyond his control. When Lon Nol deposed him, the situation 
deteriorated fast. People were constantly on the move to escape US bombing of the eastern 
parts bordering Vietnam and Lon Nol’s army, or the radical policies of the Khmer Rouge in 
their ‘liberated areas’ (for the areas held by the Khmer Rouge during the Lon Nol regime see 
the maps below on the military situation in the 1970s). Villages were abandoned by fleeing 
peasants, other villages experienced influx of refugees, and towns were evacuated by the 
Khmer Rouge ostensibly to save the population from US carpet bombing. The country was up 
in arms in a full scale civil war.
But what was destroyed in terms of social capital? How did the Sihanouk state look like from 
the perspective of social cohesion? Looking at the village, social cohesion was strong. This 
was due to the fact that ‘[t]raditionally, the economic well-being of individuals in a small 
community depends less on impersonal market relations than upon personal relations of status 
and trust within the village’ (Hughes 2001:1). Kalab describes the village ‘as a social unit, as 
the residents saw it – groups of houses supporting particular monasteries’ (Kalab 1968:523). 
A community was thus formed by a number of households or hamlets supporting a particular 
monastery. The hamlets stayed in touch with the monks by electing a representative, the 
achar, a lay Buddhist who knew the Pali formulae, details of ceremonies, and who could be 
‘trusted with money.’ This community could overlap with the administrative boundary of the 
village (Kalab 1976:64). Here we see the close connection between monks of the local pagoda 
and the village community, which gives importance to the above-mentioned fact that during 
the Samlot rebellion, peasants fled to the jungle led by their monks (Kiernan 1986:257). Sup-
port of the pagodas consisted of larger donations (often by invited outsiders), alms, or pay-
ments for services such as teaching. Some teachers also demanded bribes, a situation which 
Roeske noted for education in rural areas of Cambodia today (Roeske 2002:7). It is also pos-
sible to conclude from a report by Collins on today’s village conflict management that by of-
fering religious as well as non-religious services, the pagoda always exercised restraining in-
fluence on those disputing by reference to Buddhist ideals of peaceful conflict management. It 
therefore appears that villagers in conflict were influenced both by the religious authority of 
the monks in the pagoda and the secular authority of the village leader to avoid the dispute 
from escalating into violence.11
The village was also a social unit as it consisted of trusted kinsmen, friends and neighbours, 
which contrasted ‘our village’ to ‘others.’ An important factor in this was the election of the 
village and subdistrict leader from within the local communities, a factor that changed under 
Khmer Rouge rule when the local level administrations were staffed with political appointees. 
Within the family, strong emotional bonds and feelings of loyalty and mutual obligations ex-
isted between parents and children and ideally also between siblings – personal likes and dis-
likes included (Ebihara 1987: 19-20). 
11 Hughes 2001:9-10 and ibid.:9 cited Collins, no year:6.
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A survivor of the Khmer Rouge regime and director of a human rights NGO based in Phnom 
Penh corroborated the strong social cohesion in the countryside under Sihanouk:
“before the war in the traditional culture, boys had to be monks for 2-3 months to honour their 
parents. During their monkhood, they were not allowed to wear shoes, contact females, only 
look on the way straight ahead but not what’s left and right of the way, they were not allowed to 
speak during dinner, not to leave the pagoda at night after 4pm. This was in the rural areas, not 
in Phnom Penh.”12
This was at the same time a mechanism of social control and social integration of young 
males.
Political governance produced social cohesion, too. The election of village and subdistrict 
leaders from within the local community, who then represented this community vis-à-vis the 
government administration starting with the appointed district leader, had repercussions for 
conflict management within the village community. Whenever possible, conflicts tended to be 
solved within the community rather than by recourse to higher echelons of national law, since 
the government was somewhere ‘out there’ and therefore outside the village community (Ebi-
hara 1971:366). Describing pre-war life in a Cambodian village, Chandler argues that 
‘[q]uarrels within a village or among neighbours were settled by conciliation rather than by 
law, and they often smouldered on for years’ (Chandler 1993:104). Conflicts then were man-
aged by the chosen village leaders of good character, and through informal ways to control 
conflict and potential violence flowing from it through gossip and ostracism, which ‘do more 
to keep people in line than recourse to police or law courts’ (Ebihara 1971:370).
Economic activity produced social cohesion, too. Most peasants were ‘small landowners-
cum-cultivators’, and rice was the basis of the village economy, primarily for own consump-
tion (Ebihara 1987:17). Individual households also had fruit and palm trees and kitchen gar-
dens, caught fish in the paddy fields or produced material goods such as baskets and mats. 
Means of production such as land, draft animals, or ploughs, were owned individually, and 
land could be owned by men and women and inherited to sons and daughters. ‘Historically, 
land tenancy in peasant societies has been a means for making optimal use of different factors 
of production; at the same time it is a method by which those who do not possess land are 
able to access it for a price. Both leasing-in and leasing-out land have been practices that have 
existed for a long time’ (Chan Sophal/ Tep Saravy/ Sarthi Acharya 2001:46). Traditionally, 
all land was owned by the sovereign. In practice, land use followed ‘acquisition by the plough 
whereby a prospective user of land acquired what s/he needed for subsistence without stifling 
the collective rights of the community.’ Tenancy occurred between villagers. For instance, 
those without land could work a field for half the crop or have a kinsman work the land the 
owner had inherited in another village. Cultivation was generally the responsibility of adults 
and adolescent family members, but cooperative work groups (provas dei) could form spon-
taneously on a reciprocal basis to help during busy seasons.13
12 Interview in Phnom Penh, 4 June 2007.
13 Kalab 1968:522; Ebihara 1987:17-18; Chan Sophal/ Tep Saravy/ Sarthi Acharya 2001:1.
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However, beyond this seeming self-sufficiency, the village economy was also drawn into the 
national market economy. Money was needed to buy food or household items, pay debts and 
taxes or donate to the pagoda, for weddings, funerals and other rituals. Poorer peasants sold 
their labour for cash income. Pigs and chickens were raised, palm sugar produced, all for sale. 
Surplus produce from trees and gardens, cooked food, coolie labour and work as pedicab 
drivers all produced additional income either temporary or permanently (Ebihara 1987:18-
19). In the village studied by Kalab, residents included teachers, smiths, construction workers, 
tailors and other professions, and some peasants followed additional professions as hairdress-
ers or dentists in Phnom Penh (Kalab 1968:527). Village-exogamous marriages spread kin 
networks to other communities and into Phnom Penh (Ebihara 1987:20). The increase of these 
extra-village linkages through resettlements and flights has increased the possibility of attract-
ing sources for conflict management or livelihood support from outside the village commu-
nity, thus exposing the village to the challenges of the outside world (more details in the 
course of this study). 
Two central features characterised rural Cambodia: first, access to social capital and networks 
to persons of prestige were essential to define one’s own status and ensure integration into the 
village community and economic well-being. Second, community organisation above the 
level of the family was weak insofar as no thoroughly controlled levels of governance existed 
from the central to the village level, and leadership in the community (village chief, commune 
chief) was provided by persons of prestige, religious leadership by monks and the achar – in 
short: by person who gained their reputation from catering to the needs of the community they 
lived in. It was not before the Khmer Rouge advance in the rural areas after 1970 that the di-
vide between village community and the state bureaucracy was broken down by installing a 
system of party-appointed leaders from the villages through the levels of government up to 
the central level, which was in turn controlled from the central level down to the village level
(UNICEF 1996:38-39). 
Social cohesion in the rural areas was disrupted when the Vietnam conflict spilled over into 
Cambodia and villages saw the ‘intrusion’ of sometimes large numbers of refugees. As we 
shall see, the situation disrupted traditional networks of patronage and after 1991 made it dif-
ficult for returnees or people who came to settle in other villages than those of their origin to 
become incorporated in existing networks in the village they were going to live in.
1.4. Summary: Violence and Legitimacy of Rule
A superficial reading could lead to the conclusion that in the late 1960s, war-time violence 
spread into peaceful Cambodia. However, state executed violence was frequent as manifest in 
a number of aspects: first, in the imposition corvée labour or the extortion of land surrounding 
a corrupt regime and crony economy. Second, selective political violence against left-wing 
politicians whenever Sihanouk did not need them in order to balance the political right behind
Lon Nol. Samlot was a response to both aspects, combining peasants’ reactions to the threat 
to their livelihoods and the communists’ answer to their being harressed. The arrival of the 
Vietnam War in Cambodia put an international layer on top of these domestic processes and 
intensified them. 
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Sihanouk gained his legitimacy from controlling all three of these processes: his monarchical 
aura in the rural areas kept the peasants in check, his ability to balance the left and right in the 
urban areas was maintained by his control over the security apparatus, which enabled him to 
unleash timely and focussed violence on his opponents, and a non-aligned foreign policy on 
the international level kept Cambodia out of the Vietnam War during the first years as it bal-
anced the regional contenders China and Vietnam and at times also placated the United 
States. Yet, when control slipped on all three accounts, Sihanouk lost his grip on power. The 
continuity and unity of Cambodia promised by the Cambodian kingship lost its attraction at 
least in the urban areas, where social differentiation produced a population, which became 
more diversified in its political leanings. At the same time, the Vietnam War started to disrupt
the relatively homogenous village life.
2. War and Peace: Political and Social Changes
2.1. Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic (1970-1975) 
2.1.1. Economy and social organisation
In March 1970, with Sihanouk on state visits to Europe, the Soviet Union and China, a crowd 
attacked the North Vietnamese embassy in an outburst of anti-communist sentiment. The at-
tack had the blessings of the authorities and constituted a part in Sihanouk’s delicate balanc-
ing act between the United States and communist countries. Originally an event probably ar-
ranged for by Sihanouk to exert pressure on China and the USSR to urge a withdrawal of 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, it was seized upon by the anti-communist Lon Nol 
and took on a dimension, which Sihanouk might not have conceived of (Time Magazine
1970). The crowd sacked the embassy, and a plan was found outlining an occupation plan for 
Cambodia. Increasing tension between the pro and anti-Sihanouk factions in the government 
during March led to the army marching up in the capital. Backed by the CIA, Lon Nol, who 
had long since been set to remove Sihanouk from government, moved to depose him. The 
conservative National Assembly held a vote of confidence against Sihanouk, and Lon Nol 
became head of state based on an emergency on 18 March 1970. The monarchy was abolished 
in November 1970 and the Republic was erected.  
Lon Nol’s coup, helped by the army and legally backed by the National Assembly, ‘created a 
gap between politics, concentrated in the towns, and kingship, abolished by law but still a 
central point of reference for most of the peasantry. Republican politics, without a democratic 
tradition to lean on, could not fare much better and was very soon heading back to the old 
pattern of squabbling petty leaders.’ With the unifying monarchy gone and the sangha divided 
in its political leaning, Lon Nol was unable to give his government an air of Cambodian unity 
(Thion 1987:154-155). 
The Khmer Republic was greeted with enthusiasm in the cities by students, business people, 
and the US-leaning and US-dependent military. The rural population continued to view Siha-
nouk as god-king and protector of the poor, and rioting broke out in several provinces (Shaw-
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cross 1979:126-127). The events that followed Lon Nol’s coup in March 1970 disrupted ‘all 
conditions for demographic and socioeconomic development’ (Ea 1987:3). The domestic and 
international war, which was unleashed onto Cambodia after 1970, resulted in the closure of 
half of the schools by November 1970, destruction of infrastructure and a fleeing population 
that overcrowded Phnom Penh. Commodity prices doubled in the first war year. Official un-
employment rose from twenty to thirty percent. Rubber exports, which constituted half of the 
export earnings in 1969, ceased after April 1970. By November 1970 the five largest rubber 
plantations had stopped working and did not function again during the entire war. Rice output 
dropped from 3.8 million tons in 1969 to 2.7 in 1970. By 1971, Cambodia was importing rice. 
US military and non-military aid could only partially offset budget and trade deficits. Elec-
tions in 1972 were rigged and constant cabinet reshuffles made the weakness of the govern-
ment visible. In effect, ‘[t]o a large degree, the country was run by Lon Nol, his brother, sev-
eral of their cohorts, and the American embassy’ (Hood/ Ablin 1987:xxvi-xxvii).
“This was a major turning point in Cambodian history. Not only was Sihanouk deposed, but the 
Sihanouk state was destroyed. The careful balance among internal interests which Sihanouk had 
maintained for more than fifteen years gave way to a civil war between Cambodians who had 
vastly different plans for their country. At the same time, the exclusion of international rivalries 
was replaced by the intense involvement of other countries which pursued their goals using 
Cambodian lives (Hood/ Ablin 1987:xxiv).”
The destruction of the Sihanouk state affected both the top levels and lower levels of the pa-
tronage pyramid. On top, Lon Nol instituted an exchange of personnel loyal to him, not to 
Sihanouk. At the bottom, the Khmer Rouge reorganised village society in the liberated areas 
along their revolutionary lines. In the beginning, the Khmer Rouge recruited support of all 
sympathetic elements and thus acted according to the heterogeneous nature of the resistance, 
called Front Uni Nationale du Kampuchea (FUNK).14 Intellectuals, who had fled from the 
cities during the late 1960s under the repressive Sihanouk, were welcome as was the Buddhist 
clergy as long as they were sympathetic towards the goal of the Khmer Rouge. The percep-
tions of this goal did not necessarily include communist convictions, but detestation of the 
Lon Nol regime and US support for it. FUNK rather had the outlook of an anti-imperialist 
united front using all nationalist elements whether communist or not to fight the immediate 
enemy (Thion 1972:11). 
14 After his overthrow, Sihanouk took refuge in China, which refused to recognise Lon Nol’s new state. From 
China, Sihanouk organised the resistance against the new government together with his militarily well orga-
nised former adversaries, the communists. The new resistance was called Gouvernement Royal d’Union Na-
tionale du Kampuchea (GRUNK) with Sihanouk as prime minister. Khieu Samphan was deputy prime minis-
ter, minister of defence and commander in chief, while the military operations were directed by Pol Pot. 
GRUNK’s military arm was the Front Uni Nationale du Kampuchea (FUNK). Both included the communists 
as strongest group. It should be noted, however, that Sihanouk had no control over the Khmer Rouge what-
soever and the relationship remained a short-lived marriage of necessity. In effect, the FUNK troops almost 
entirely consisted of communist groups. The GRUNK was recognised by China as legitimate government af-
ter Beijing and Hanoi had both attempted to convince Lon Nol of a continued use of Cambodian territory by 
communist forces against South Vietnam (Hood/ Ablin 1987).
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Beginning in 1970 with the advance of North Vietnamese troops from the east, the old elite 
made up of teachers, village officials and merchants fled their villages.15 Being the strongest 
force in FUNK and by 1973 halted from victory against Lon Nol mainly by lack of supply 
from indignant North Vietnam towards which the Khmer Rouge leadership acted increasingly 
hostile (in addition, the Soviet Union maintained relations with Lon Nol until 1975), the
Khmer Rouge moved to rid FUNK and GRUNK of Sihanoukists in 1973 and expelled the 
remaining Vietnamese communist troops and advisors from the areas the Khmer Rouge con-
trolled. Sihanouk, originally used to recruit among the peasantry, was now being discredited 
and used to radicalise the insurgency. With the Pol Pot faction on the rise against the pro-
Vietnamese faction, purges were carried out. 
In 1973, the communists carried out a Democratic Revolution in areas under their control (see 
maps below) with varying degrees according to which faction had the upper hand in the re-
spective region. Thus, they abandoned the broad-based anti-imperialist front and moved to 
wipe out economic classes which were ‘antagonistic to the revolution’: they ‘abolished pri-
vate landownership, confiscated private property, outlawed trade, demonetized the economy, 
collectivized dining, separated children from parents, disallowed religious practices and holi-
days, prohibited jewelry and colorful dress, imposed harsh communal work schedules, and 
uprooted and relocated some villages. […] complaints or transgressions could bring death’.16
The communists then set out to change the local rural administrations on district, subdistrict 
and village levels from persons of respect earned by traditional means, as described by Ebi-
hara and Kalab, or economic influence, to persons of political reliability. The old patronage 
strings were then replaced by a party structure that employed often local officials but made 
sure that they had the correct political colouring. Private ownership of land and means of pro-
duction were abolished (Kiernan 1986:317-318, 321, 369).
The following series of maps shows the areas under communist and government control 
throughout the Lon Nol regime. 
15 Kiernan 1986:317 cited Brown 1972:133.
16 Hood/ Ablin 1987:xxix-xxx; Ebihara 1987.
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Maps: Geo-Military Situations 
Source: Etcheson, 1984: 104.
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Source: Etcheson, 1984: 105.
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Source: Etcheson, 1984: 112.
Oliver Hensengerth – Transitions of Cambodia
21
Source: Etcheson, 1984: 116.
The Democratic Revolution was not implemented equally throughout the zones under com-
munist control, however. Kiernan gives an inside account of the regional variation, with 
which the Democratic Revolution was carried out between 1973 and 1975. Having estab-
lished branches in a number of areas, variation depended on a number of factors, most impor-
tantly the influence of those cadres who had returned from Hanoi and their reluctance to rush 
collectivisation up to communal dining. Being aware of regional variations even within the 
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zones, it can be said with the precaution of overgeneralisation that the influence of the Pol Pot 
faction was greatest over the Northern and the South-western Zones (Kiernan 1986:338-346, 
363. The zones were the military regions between 1970 and 1975 and between 1975 and 1979 
replaced the provinces as administrative level). As a consequence, mutual aid teams were de-
veloped into higher-stage cooperatives and communal dining was introduced. Hanoi-trained 
cadres were executed, even though some retained military positions in the Northern Zone. 
They were totally eclipsed in the South-western Zone. Poor peasants were put in charge of 
villages, thus giving the poorest new opportunities. In the South-western Zone, Buddhist ac-
tivity was quelled and Islam forbidden, monks drafted, village and subdistrict chiefs ap-
pointed by CPK (Communist Party of Kampuchea) district committees. Non-compliant peo-
ple were killed. Food shortages owing to collectivisation provoked a rebellion of peasants 
against the CPK policies and cadres were assassinated by angry peasants, forcing the CPK to 
reintroduced private eating. Women and 16-year olds were recruited into the army (Kiernan 
1986:371-380). In Special Zone 25, which was part of the Eastern Zone until 1971, coopera-
tives were established ‘in a non-coercive manner.’ Monks were not drafted, communal eating 
not introduced. But in five districts, the Democratic Revolution was carried out, a land reform 
was forced through, and Mosques were closed (Kiernan 1986:380-384). In the Eastern Zone, 
where many cadres were married to Vietnamese women, mutual aid teams ‘remained the 
norm’ as did cooperation and economic relations with Vietnam. The exception was Memut 
district in Region 21, where cooperatives were established, communal eating was introduced 
and Vietnam denounced as revisionist due to its peace agreement with the United States and 
opposition to the introduction of cooperatives (Kiernan 1986:386-389).
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Map: Administrative Regions in 1970
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Map: Democratic Kampuchea 
Source: Cambodian Genocide Program, Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/cgp/maps/bigmap02.gif.
When US bombing resumed in January 1973 after a short halt after the Geneva agreements, 
Cambodians started to flee the areas controlled by the communists and flooded into the urban 
areas, particularly Phnom Penh. The destruction of the bombing was such that Cambodian 
peasants commented US bombing as more memorable than the Khmer Rouge period of 1975-
1979 that was to follow. Essentially, it alienated the population from the Khmer Republic: 
wedding parties were hit along with funerals, rice fields, water buffaloes, villages, hospitals, 
and monasteries.17 Thus, the countryside was radicalised against the Khmer Republic (Kier-
nan 1986:xii, 349-357); it helped Pol Pot to emerge victorious over moderate communist fac-
tions (Kiernan 1986:xii); and it provoked the conviction in the FUNK resistance that ‘their 
urban compatriots were quite willing to see the entire countryside destroyed and plastered 
over with concrete as long as they could enjoy a parasitical existence as U.S. clients. It is cer-
17 Hood/ Ablin 1987:xxviii; Ebihara 1987:21-22.
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tain that FUNK policy became much harsher after the bombing’ (Vickery 1976:27). Yet, in 
addition, while Cambodians fled US bombs from January 1973, they started to flee from the 
areas in which the Khmer Rouge carried out the Democratic Revolution from the latter part of 
1973 (Hood/ Ablin 1987:xxx). When the Khmer Republic was defeated, there were between 
500,000 and 1 million people killed, 3.4 million refugees, and the population in Phnom Penh 
had risen from 600,000 people in 1969 to 3 million. 1,100 out of 1,400 rice mills were de-
stroyed. 75 percent of draft animals were killed (Hood/ Ablin 1987:xxxi).
2.1.2. Politics
Having ousted Sihanouk, Lon Nol demanded the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces 
from Cambodian soil and closed the ports for Soviet and Chinese supply shipments to Viet-
nam. North Vietnam, with the exiled Cambodian communists returning to Cambodia, now 
fully supported the Khmer Rouge and moved against Lon Nol’s army, the Forces Armées 
Nationales Khmères, which was set to drive the North Vietnamese army out of Eastern Cam-
bodia. 
The United States started an incursion into Cambodia of two months from 30 April 1970 in-
cluding South Vietnamese troops to destroy Vietnamese communist bases in Cambodia and 
save Lon Nol. The incursion was aided by heavy US bombing in the Operation Freedom Deal 
between 19 May 1970 and 15 August 1973. The result was that, owing to the two-month in-
cursion, North Vietnamese troops were driven into the centre of Cambodia, which greatly 
helped the Cambodian insurgency: ‘Shielded from the Lon Nol army by experienced Viet-
namese troops’ the Khmer Rouge reorganised themselves and recruited among the Sihanouk-
loyal peasantry with the help of tape recordings of Sihanouk’s call to arms. Their forces num-
bered 40,000 in 1973, when Vietnamese forces withdrew at the end of the Vietnam War.18
The operation Chenla II in the second half of 1971 meant to be a major offensive against the 
FUNK forces, proved a disaster for Lon Nol and showed his inability to act against the guer-
rilla strategy, which the well organised Khmer Rouge forces employed as copy from China’s 
communist guerrilla in the Chinese civil war. Rural bases were created, from which they ad-
vanced to and surrounded the cities. The defeat of Chenla II also discredited the government. 
Its support base, such as students who had welcomed the republic, crumbled and the enthusi-
asm surrounding the ouster of the inefficient and corrupt Sihanouk quickly vanished. Accusa-
tions were manifold: governmental authoritarianism, inefficiency and corruption (‘Sihanou-
kism without Sihanouk’); military officers created ghost soldiers or did not report deaths and 
desertions to pocket the salaries, kept food rations for themselves while the ordinary soldier 
was starving and did not receive salaries; officers sold gas, arms, medicine, ammunition, and 
equipment on the black market and often to communist troops (a large portion of arms and 
ammunition used by the Khmer Rouge were bought from the military of the Khmer Repub-
lic).19 According to the Red Cross, the habit of army officers to create ghost soldiers contin-
18 Hood/ Ablin 1987:xxv-xxvi; Chandler 1991:201; Thion 1987:155.
19 Shawcross 1979:313-315; Chandler 1991:205.
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ued in the post-1993 Royal Cambodian Armed Forces ‘in order to meet unit quotas and attract 
supplies that can be traded on the black market’ (International Committee of the Red Cross 
1999:27n31). 
The Paris Peace Agreements of January 1973 did not see an agreement on Cambodia since the 
Khmer Rouge refused to negotiate given their perceived immediate victory against Lon Nol. 
So after a short stop of bombing activities after the Paris agreements, the United States re-
started bombing Cambodia for a period of eight months until 15 August 1973. By then, ac-
cording to Shawcross, the United States had dropped 539,129 tons of bombs on the country-
side since the start of Operation Menu in 1969. In comparison: 160,000 tons were dropped on 
Japan during World War II (Shawcross 1979:297). By 1974, US aid exceeded the Cambodian 
budget of 1969. Only two percent of national income was from domestic sources. Rice output 
was at one quarter of pre-war levels. Prices were up by 5000 percent. The United States had 
provided Lon Nol with 1.18 billion US Dollar in military aid and 503 million US Dollar in 
humanitarian aid. 7 billion US Dollar had been spent bombing the country (Hood/ Ablin 
1987:xxxi).
2.2. Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)
2.2.1. Economy and social organisation
In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge took over Phnom Penh and forced the population into the 
countryside. The new state was called Democratic Kampuchea. On 5 January 1976, Sihanouk 
was made head of state, but quickly came to blows with the Khmer Rouge. He was replaced 
by Ieng Sary on 4 April 1976 and returned into Chinese exile. 
Socially, Cambodia’s population was divided into ‘base people’ or ‘old people’, and ‘new 
people.’ Base people were ideologically reliable people: poor and lower-middle peasants who 
had lived in communist-controlled areas before 1975. New people were those ‘liberated’ after 
1975. They were generally politically suspect and put away in labour camps or were exe-
cuted: residents of urban areas (intellectuals, professionals, ethnic Chinese, Buddhist clergy), 
plus peasants who had fled the war into urban areas and since then were considered ideologi-
cally contaminated (Ebihara 1987:24-25). Classification additionally occurred according to 
class background (lower and lower-middle peasants, middle and upper class background etc.) 
and membership in collectives (full rights, candidates, depositees). These classifications re-
placed the position of an individual within the community based on good character.20 Ethnic 
minorities were subjected to Khmerisation, especially the Muslim Cham. Until then, the Bud-
dhist pagoda and the sangha had functioned as ‘moral, social, and educational center for vil-
lagers’ and had been a place for religious and social activity (Ebihara 1987:21+33). Now, the 
basic social institutions, the family, the village and the pagoda were abolished and the tradi-
tional informal cooperative work teams institutionalised (Ebihara 1987:23). 
20 Ebihara 1987:25+32 and 25 cited Heder 1980b:6.
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Map: Population Movements 1975-1978
Source: Chandler, 1991: 248. 
It was this destruction of traditional values and social relations as points of reference which 
gave people ‘[f]eelings of powerlessness. […] Beyond the shelter of the community, within 
which the individual operates with assurance to build up the necessary assets for survival, and 
in the face of powerful alien forces such as militarisation or refugee camp bureaucracy, vil-
lagers find it more difficult to plan strategies for survival’ (Hughes 2001:21). The most severe 
disruption of village life accordingly did not occur through mere violence, but through the 
destruction of trust among the villagers. As Meas Nee described, the only respected member 
of the traditional village hierarchy that was to survive in one village was the achar, the pious 
layman, since he was a loyal Khmer Rouge follower. Consequently, ‘[w]hen even an achar 
could be a killer, the people did not know who to trust’.21 It is against this background that 
Thion argues that in the highly collectivised society of Democratic Kampuchea, belonging to 
21 Hughes 2001:21-22 cited Meas Nee 1995:21.
Oliver Hensengerth – Transitions of Cambodia
28
a patron-client string of party fraction, clan etc. was critical for survival (Thion 1987:160-
161). This situation referred importance to traditional forms of social relations while mistrust 
against the authorities spread in a state which was to do away with traditional forms of social 
cohesion. The downside of this, however, was that it could mean death for clients whose pa-
trons were purged. This was the case with the purges in the Eastern Zone in 1978, when not 
only the party chain of the zone was removed, but also a large portion of the local population 
for perceived lack of trust towards the new command (Thion 1987:160-161).
However, at least until 1977/78, when Pol Pot won the inner party struggle, the radical poli-
cies were carried out with differing zeal in the administrative areas and also with local varia-
tion depending on ecological settings and interpretation of policies by local cadres, leading to 
differences in work requirements or food supplies (Ebihara 1987:23-24). This mirrors the pe-
riod of the Democratic Revolution between 1973 and 1975. This was also true for education, 
as the Khmer Rouge intended to do away with the education of the old regime, but not with 
‘education per se.’ Rather, education was subjected to the ideological goals of the communist 
party, and teaching staff was recruited from the ‘old people’ instead of professional teachers
(Ayres 1999:210+214). Without trying to diminish the brutality of the regime, Ayres warns 
against a ‘discourse of destruction’ and quotes from Vickery’s book Cambodia, 1975-1982, in 
which the latter argued that Khmer Rouge atrocities ‘occurred at some place at some time, but 
not everywhere all the time’.22
Administratively, there were seven zones (phumipeak) plus an autonomous zone in Kampong
Som (Sihanoukville) and a Special Zone in Kratie. The zones were divided into regions or 
sectors (damban) to replace the system of provinces: the Eastern Zone, the South-western 
Zone, the Western Zone, the North-western Zone, the North-eastern Zone, the Northern Zone 
and the Central Zone. The policies found modest application in the North-eastern, South-
western and Eastern Zone, which all had seen a comparably long CPK influence, and the 
situation was also tolerable in the Western and Central zones. The Eastern zone was until 
1978 administered by Vietnam-friendly cadres, who then were purged in inner-party struggles 
and fled to Vietnam only to return in 1979. The Khmer Rouge policies were particularly harsh 
in the North and North-western zones, were the former Phnom Penh residents (the ‘new peo-
ple’) were resettled. Below the zones, the old system of districts (srok), subdistricts or com-
munes (khum), and villages (phum) was retained, each however chaired by a committee, ulti-
mately reaching up to the CPK’s Central Committee.23
Egalitarian Democratic Kampuchea also had its elite. On top of society lived the communist 
party cadres and the armed forces. Education and health were poor as the Khmer Rouge exe-
cuted teachers and physicians as they belonged to the ‘new people.’ The goal of education in 
Democratic Kampuchea was ideological indoctrination including basic maths and reading to 
force new values upon children and divert them away from the traditional values of the elders, 
who were attached to the family, the village and the pagoda. Health care suffered the same 
fate as education: physicians were executed or prohibited from carrying out their profession. 
22 Ayres 1999:207 cited Vickery 1984:50.
23 Ayres 2000:109; Ebihara 1987:23-25; Chandler 2008:258-259.
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Still the elites of party and armed forces probably had access to Western medical care, while 
many others, in particular, the new people, had to rely on more or less effective natural reme-
dies or bartered their food portions for basic drugs. If there were any hopes that a communist 
egalitarian regime would wipe out the corruption and nepotism of the Sihanouk and Lon Nol 
years, they were soon destroyed. It rather seems that one patron-client system attached to the 
Lon Nol government was replaced with another attached to the Pol Pot administration. For 
instance, as Thion describes, Pol Pot put his nephews and nieces in career paths in the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee. The ministry was run by Pol Pot’s brother-
in-law; the Central Committee was controlled by himself. Two of Ieng Sary’s daughters were 
cared well for, too: the oldest was appointed director of the former Calmette hospital, the sec-
ond director of the Pasteur Institute. This elite ‘enjoyed privileges in lodging, food allow-
ances, and even some luxuries.’ Power lay in the ‘control of food and other basic necessities’, 
thus putting the elite ‘not only in control of other people’s material needs, but they could en-
joy private banquets with the best food, servants, and so on.’ This opened the way to corrup-
tion with food as most valued currency (Thion 1987:158-160) and enabled the elite to exer-
cise social control through the control of food supplies.
Economically, the cooperative was the basic unit of Cambodian life. Self-reliance after dec-
ades of economic dependence from France and the United States was the superseding princi-
ple. Again, regional variation occurred along the factors degree of collectivisation, ecological 
settings, and implementation of central directives by local cadres. The communist party’s 
main goal was to institute an agrarian subsistence economy based on rice: in a chauvinistic 
appeal to the greatness of Khmer civilisation, the greatness of the Angkor civilisation based 
on refined irrigation systems as the basis of economic prowess was to be re-achieved. Accord-
ingly, the communist party ordered the construction of nationwide irrigation systems in order 
to decrease the dependency of the rice harvest on seasonal rain. Rice production improved 
between 1975 and 1978, but ‘exporting and stockpiling meant that less was distributed to the 
people at the end of this period than at the beginning’.24 Surplus agricultural produce was har-
vested in ever higher forms of collectivisation up to the subdistrict level, and extracted 
through strict social control down to the local level. Collectivisation abolished the individu-
ally owned means of production (Ebihara 1987:24, 26, 27, 28). This was designed to destruct 
traditional family and clan bonds and the family as basic social, economic and political unit 
with the aim to create an egalitarian society without the need of traditional ties between fam-
ily and kinsmen to organise life in Cambodia (Ebihara 1987:29-31). Economic policies, first 
introduced in the communist base areas in the first half of the 1970s, were now extended 
throughout the country: the currency was abolished, trade and commerce only possible 
through barter (mostly rice and remaining personal property). Foreign trade became strictly 
controlled. Given the hostility towards Vietnam, China became the main ally, but trade also 
happened with France, Britain and the United States through Hong Kong (Hood/ Ablin 1987).
Underpinning this economic self-reliance was an education system that was to teach literacy, 
technology and ideology. A Four-Year Plan to build Socialism in all Fields, 1977-1980 was 
outlined for education to teach the following subjects: reading and writing; arithmetic; geog-
24 Hood/ Ablin 1987:xxxvii; Ebihara 1987:25-26+33.
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raphy of Cambodia; natural science, physics, and chemistry; history of the revolution; and the 
party’s politics and organisation. The plan, however, was a fabrication of the party centre 
around Pol Pot without consultation of the Vietnam-wing or the rank and file. Accordingly, 
the plan was rejected and no national education plan could take hold in Cambodia. Education, 
therefore, was scattered and found different application in different geographical regions de-
pending on the relationships between regional, district, subdistrict and village leaders, be-
tween regional leaders and the Pol Pot part centre, the pre-revolutionary conditions in the re-
gion, agricultural fertility, and population. Education was further subjected to combating the 
perceived threat posed by Vietnam against the new regime, which also included purging the 
party of its Vietnam-friendly wing. The result was that of the schools that functioned prior to 
the outbreak of hostilities with Vietnam, in 1978 there were hardly any schools in operation. 
When the Khmer Rouge were ousted in 1979, they established control over large areas of the 
provinces of Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Thom, Preah Vihear, Kam-
pot, and the northern parts of Battambang [including today’s Pailin province] and Siem Reap. 
In these areas, they continued to apply their ideas of education (Ayres 1999:212-213, 217-
218).
Politically, therefore, the result of the Khmer Rouge social policies was the penetration of 
state authority to the village level through direct political control of the village chiefs by si-
multaneously eclipsing the moral and political authority of the pagodas and the cosmology of 
the Buddhist kingship, to which the pagodas were linked and received their authority. So-
cially, traditional family ties were replaced by ideologically sanctioned relationships, which 
included the separation of children from their parents and a general spread of distrust in peo-
ple-to-people relationships. Violence control and conflict resolution were subjected to ideo-
logical principles and happened along ideological lines through which alleged and real ene-
mies of the new social order could be identified, singled out, and punished. The practical 
mechanisms of violence control and conflict resolution were then ideological indoctrination in 
conjunction with self-critisicm sessions and collectivisations, control over food supplies, and 
new patronage networks of the Khmer Rouge elite to replace the old networks as far as they 
still existed in the war-torn areas in 1975. Punishment was then exercised through social pres-
sure and control in self-critisicm sessions and collectives, and the threat of exclusion from 
food supplies and purges of unwelcome patrons, i.e. the threat of exclusion from the necessi-
ties of life.
2.2.2. Politics
Internationally, after short-lived rapprochements between Democratic Kampuchea and Viet-
nam, the former acted increasingly anti-Vietnamese as relations between China and Vietnam 
broke down and the anti-Vietnamese Pol Pot faction prevailed in party struggles against the 
pro-Vietnamese faction in 1978. After April 1975, Cambodian troops occupied territory 
claimed by both Vietnam and Cambodia. Vietnam counterattacked after having defeated 
South Vietnam in the same year. Then, Phnom Penh and Hanoi sat down for border talks on 
the Brévié line of 1939 and based on an agreement between North Vietnam, the National 
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and Sihanouk in 1967. The talks broke down, how-
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ever, and military actions resumed in January 1977. In early 1978, China tried to negotiate a 
settlement between Phnom Penh and Hanoi. At the same time, however, relations between 
Vietnam and China deteriorated quickly and broke completely after the friendship treaty be-
tween Vietnam and the USSR in November 1978: Vietnam, seeing increased Chinese support 
for the Khmer Rouge in the form of arms, aid and advisors as potentially destabilising its na-
tional security, and regarding the US-China rapprochement with suspicion, turned to the So-
viet Union. While ethnic Vietnamese fled Cambodia, ethnic Chinese fled Vietnam. Vietnam, 
considering the military manoeuvres of the Khmer Rouge at the common border a severe se-
curity threat, invaded Cambodia in December 1978 and in January 1979 proclaimed the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) with Heng Samrin as prime minister and today’s Prime 
Minister Hun Sen as foreign minister on top of the new state. 
Before, the exiled Cambodian communists in Vietnam had formed the Kampuchean National 
Front for National Salvation. Their leaders returned to Cambodia with the invasion and 
formed the new government (Taufmann 1992:8-9). The Khmer Rouge leadership fled to the 
Thai border. With assistance by Thailand, which saw the Vietnamese nearing its territory with 
suspicion, the deposed Khmer Rouge were able to reorganise and start an insurgency against 
the new government.
2.3. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979-1991): (Re)constructing govern-
ment, economy and society in the midst of crisis
2.3.1. Economy and social organisation
While portions of the poor peasantry had socially and economically advanced under Pol Pot, 
the Vietnamese invasion was not unwelcome among those, who belonged to the ‘new people.’
The new leadership moved to restore traditional family relations, reopened schools and put an 
end to the extreme collectivisation of social and economic life, however without aiming at 
reconstructing the society of the Sihanouk and Lon Nol years. To further strengthen and le-
gitimising the post-1979 government, a National Assembly was elected in 1981 with the can-
didates strongly controlled by the government. The Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary 
Party (KPRP) was re-founded, aiming at creating a control mechanism from the central gov-
ernment down to the village level.
After 1979, socio-economic differentiation re-emerged: government officials, traders, urban 
professionals, whether new or pre-1975, resurfaced on top of society. Within the peasantry, 
differentiation occurred again, dividing poorer and richer peasants with an ‘upper stratum of 
peasantry’ many of which had been middle or prosperous in the old society.25
At the same time, the old vertical relations of patronage and clientelism re-emerged surround-
ing a new group of politicians: the Kampuchean National Front for National Salvation in-
cluded several non-communists, and members of the Buddhist clergy were put in high posi-
tions. The link between the political and the Buddhist elite is an important one, because, as 
25 Ebihara 1987:40-41 cited Heder 1980a:104, 107, 108-109.
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Kent emphasised, ‘Buddhism was and remains a source of both legitimacy and power for 
leaders. In Cambodia, power is still conceived of as dwelling in the Buddhist pagodas, and 
access to such power is a necessary component of political survival’ (Kent 2006:350, also 
353-354). Human rights NGO staff interviewed by the author in Cambodia complained how-
ever that the utilisation of Buddhism for political legitimation has recreated the functional 
aspects of Buddhism (monastic institutions), but not morality.26
Having experienced the expel of the Khmer Rouge as act of liberation, refugee communists 
and Buddhist clergy jointly moved to establish control over Cambodia. From this decision 
derived the political links between CPP and Buddhist clergy of the Mohanikay order, to 
which the majority of Cambodian Buddhists belong (the smaller branch of Cambodian Bud-
dhism, the Dhammayuth order, is associated with the monarchy27). It can thus be argued that 
Buddhism again became associated with the ruling elites and a function of post-1979 govern-
ance.28
After 1979, people were on the move again: they left the communes, which the new state 
rolled back to smaller entities or indeed private cultivation, to search for relatives or to return 
to their native villages; people of bourgeois background made their way abroad; poor peasants 
had no food; others left to escape fighting between the new government and the Khmer 
Rouge. The latter pursued a scorched earth policy and either killed captured people or forced 
them to come along on their way to the Thai border. ‘Family and kin networks were reestab-
lished as best as possible, given the losses suffered during the ravages both before and after 
1975.’29 Acharya estimates that during the Khmer Rouge period, 35-40 percent of the popula-
tion were uprooted. In addition, during the entire time of the war from 1970 to 1992, 400,000-
600,000 people left Cambodia, including the 350,000-370,000 refugees, which took refuge in 
the camps along the Thai border after 1979 (Acharya 2003:3-4). The economy was near col-
lapse. A major international aid campaign was set in motion to prevent starvation of the popu-
lation. Only a small amount of rice could be harvested in 1979; fish was largely absent due to 
26 Interview in Phnom Penh, 4 June 2007 and interview in Battambang, 20 July 2007.
27 The two branches of Cambodian Buddhism were unified in 1981 and headed by Tep Vong. The two orders 
were separated again in 1991, with Tep Vong as patriarch of the Mohanikay. Bou Kry was made head of the 
Dhammayuth order. In 2007, Tep Vong was appointed Great Supreme Patriarch, placing him above Bou Kry.
28 It is in the light of this post-1979 connection of politics and Buddhism that the Great Supreme Patriarch, Tep 
Vong, in 2007 ordered to defrock the Khmer Krom Monk Tim Sakhorn for allegedly harming relations be-
tween Cambodia and Vietnam (Yun 2 July 2007:1-2 and 3 July 2007:1-2). Khmer Krom monks, originating 
from Kampuchea Krom, a formerly Cambodian territory which now makes up Southern Vietnam, are critical 
of the government for not caring sufficiently about the fate of the Khmer minority in Vietnam. Only one 
week before, on 24 June 2007, Phnom Penh’s Supreme Patriarch Noun Nget announced a decree which 
would prohibit monks to participate in political demonstrations for peace arguing that Cambodia is at peace 
already. The decree was signed by the Minister of Cults and Religions, Khun Haing. Noun Nget was de-
frocked during the Khmer Rouge, but joined the monkhood again after 1979. This mirrors earlier calls by the 
same patriarch for monks not to vote and remain apolitical (Sam Rith/ Charles McDermid 29 June-12 July 
2007:1+11).
29 Ebihara 1987:38, 39+35; Ea 1987:8+10; Charny 1987:244; International Committee of the Red Cross 
1999:6+24; Acharya 2003:3-4.
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the wide unavailability of nets and boats to exploit the Tonle Sap. After 1980, food produc-
tion went back to subsistence levels and threats of famine ceased by 1981.30
Ebihara described the social, cultural and economic policies of the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea as a ‘synthesis’ of pre-1975 and socialist elements resulting in a ‘semisocialist 
economy.’ This was benefited by the allegiance of the majority of people to traditional cul-
tural elements such as Buddhism and family ties, which the Khmer Rouge policies did not 
have enough time to root out, neither in their pre-1975 base areas, nor in the whole country 
between 1975 and 1978/79; the village again became the basic territorial and socio-political 
unit (Ebihara 1987:35+36). Within an unstable situation – fighting continued on the ground –
the government rebuilt destroyed villages while other communities, which had experienced 
disruption due to influx of refugees, relocations, killings and collectivisation, were able to 
stabilise. The new leadership restored basic health care and the education system. While the 
collectivisation was not utterly abandoned, it was rolled back to lower levels and was less 
strictly handled with local variation. In addition, the mobile work teams were abolished. Pri-
vate cultivation was allowed and open markets were re-established to sell farming surplus. 
Money was re-introduced (Ebihara 1987:35-38). 
The informal cooperative work groups again became the customary form of cooperation in 
the villages. Also, there was a tendency again to choose village leaders according to tradi-
tional virtues rather than ideological background, but at the same time, the KPRP structure 
was established which eventually turned village leaders into political apointees: ‘persons of 
“good character,” who had some economic and/or educational status in the old society and 
who displayed intelligence, charisma and/or nonantagonistic forcefulness.’31 They functioned 
as ‘hinges’ or ‘brokers’ ‘between the local community and the larger political system, be-
tween “us” and “them”’.32 However, while in the old society village and subdistrict officials 
were seen by villagers as belonging to ‘us’, they may now be considered as belonging to 
‘them’.33
The watering down of the barriers between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was aided by turning village lead-
ers into political appointees, thus cooptating them, wherever the post-1979 government was 
able to exercise influence. In the sense that political attitudes were crucial in whether or not a 
person was to become village chief, this policy can be regarded as continuation of the Khmer 
Rouge policy of choosing party affiliation over skills. In addition, this policy continued the 
Khmer Rouge instituted policy of choosing the village leaders from above. Thus the village 
level was opened to political competition between elite factions and discrimination of political 
opponents. 
Consequently, the village chief has become part of the national administration. However, as 
Conway wrote, ‘he is, unlike Commune [i.e. subdistrict], District or Provincial Officials, resi-
dent among his constituents. While a village chief may desire to extract as much as possible 
30 Ea 1987:8; Ebihara 1987:36; Charny 1987:244-245+247-248; Hood/ Ablin 1987:li.
31 Ebihara 1987:40 cited Heder 1980a:96+97.
32 Ebihara 1987:40 cited Wolf 1956.
33 Ebihara 1987:40 cited Heder 1980a:109+107.
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from villagers, often driven by demands from higher officials, this desire has to be balanced 
by a fear of reprisals’.34
In economic terms, some exports resumed, mainly to Soviet bloc countries given the interna-
tional isolation of Cambodia after 1979. These included rubber, kapok, cotton, and fish. In 
1987, average per capita income was less than 100 US Dollar per year. A basic health care 
system with hospitals, medical centres and a medical school in Phnom Penh was established. 
Education with elementary (1.5 million children), middle (60.000) and high schools (4.000) 
came into operation as well as traditional forms of art such as theatre and dance (used partly 
for propaganda purposes) (Ebihara 1987:39; Hood/ Ablin 1987:li-lii). Religious activity sur-
faced again. Around 70,000 of 100,000 Buddhist bonzes of pre-1975 Cambodia are believed 
to have died. Ordainment started quickly, but was open to people above the age of 50 only, 
plus Buddhist bonzes had to propagate the official party line and were kept under party con-
trol to prevent Buddhism from becoming a challenge to the state. Nevertheless, the resurgence 
of religious life showed the importance of the local pagoda for social cohesion and its post-
1979 significance in ‘offering social and psychological support to a people who have under-
gone years of extreme stress’.35 Consequently, the socialist outlook of Cambodia differed 
markedly from other socialist countries, and therefore, ‘the Soviet Union does not define 
Cambodia […] as a state progressing toward socialism.’ The KPRP became reorganised down 
to the local level. Between 1979 and 1985, it grew from 66 to 7,500 members (Hood/ Ablin
1987:lii-liii). To date (2008) this has provided the leadership under Prime Minister Hun Sen 
with a considerable local support base and patron-client relations by monopolising control 
over local authorities, as opposed to Sihanouk’s Front Uni Nationale pour un Cambodge 
Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) and the Sam Rainsy Party
(SRP), which are refused access to media resources in order to broadcast their messages to the 
countryside, which constitutes 85 percent of Cambodia’s population.36
The party structure remained intact during UNTAC and was one factor which enabled Hun 
Sen, who became Prime Minister 1985, to hold on to power to the present day. For instance, 
in the first local elections after UNTAC, held in 2002, the CPP won all but 23 of the 1621 
communes. The outcome of the second local elections, held in April 2007, showed a similar 
result: the CPP won 1592 of the 1621 communes. This owes a great deal to a strategy known 
as ‘going down to the base’, a 1980s policy of bringing socialist propaganda to the rural heart-
lands and fight the guerrilla opposition. Today, this strategy is used to cultivate patronage 
networks to ensure the CPP’s electoral victory in Cambodia’s rural areas (Un 2005:221). In 
addition, a money politics style of patronage networks is sustained by requiring government 
bureaucracies to pay into party coffers for election campaigns, known as the ‘black box.’ This 
has led to an increase in corruption as government officials have to divide their income 
through corruption into three parts: themselves, superiors, and the black box. The former gov-
ernor of Phnom Penh, Chea Sophara, allegedly had to pay 20,000 US Dollar to the CPP every 
month so that Hun Sen could build schools and buy rice to distribute to peasants (Un 
34 Hughes 2001:18 cited Conway 2000.
35 Ebihara 1987:42-43; Hood/ Ablin 1987:lii-liii.
36 Un 2005:213-214; Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003:4.
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2005:227). Ledgerwood argues that the money style of networks of patronage has not yet ex-
tended to the countryside, but that it is still of a more traditional outlook: 
“This is how everything works in Cambodia. In a rural setting it is the clients who gives [sic] 
small gifts or labour while the village chief or other big guy will provide protection and assis-
tance in an emergency. In Phnom Penh this relationship has become distorted because patron 
client relations have become almost entirely monetised. The little guys in the Khsae have to 
pass up money and what they give is supposed to be redistributed and sent back down. That’s 
why before elections the government gives goods away. They are proving that what goes up is 
being redistributed. In the city however, its about lust for power, and to switch it back is prob-
lematic (Interview with Judy Ledgerwood in Gender and Development for Cambodia 2003:Part 
Two).”
On 1 May 1989, a new constitution instituted economic reforms towards a market-oriented 
system, in the context of which private ownership was formally endorsed and Buddhism made 
the state religion. Around 90 percent of the solidarity groups for collective farming were dis-
banded. Transportation, health care, education and most state markets became partially priva-
tised. 
2.3.2. Politics
Internationally, Cambodia along with Vietnam was isolated: aid to Vietnam was cancelled, 
the invasion condemned, and the Khmer Rouge considered the legitimate government of 
Cambodia. They retained Cambodia’s seat in the United Nations. Despite the initial chaos and 
an economy in crisis, most of the aid that was channelled into Cambodia was targeted for 
those, which had taken refuge along the Thai border; Western aid in Cambodia itself was 
meant to relief Cambodia, not help develop it: the United States and Thailand, having the 
greatest influence on disbursement of aid, aimed at not supporting or legitimising the new 
government. An estimate of 50 US Dollar was spent on each Cambodian in the interior, 440 
US Dollar in the border regions and 1,120 US Dollar in the Thai refugee camps.37 Therefore, 
for political reasons, the ‘population of the PRK was […] kept isolated from the wider world 
once the massive emergency operation of 1979-1982 was over’ (UNICEF 1996:15). 
To further delegitimise the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was formed in July 1982 to replace Democratic Kampuchea 
as internationally recognised government of Cambodia. The CGDK consisted of three differ-
ent political groupings: Sihanouk and his newly founded royalist party Front Uni Nationale 
pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif with its military arm Armée 
Nationale Sihanoukienne (ANS); the communist Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) as 
successor of the Khmer Rouge’s CPK; and the republican Khmer People´s National Libera-
tion Front (KPNLF) led by Son Sann with its military arm Khmer People’s National Libera-
tion Armed Forces or Khmer People’s National Liberation Army (KPNLAF). 
Sihanouk, still the symbol of Cambodian unity, became president of the CGDK, Son Sann 
prime minister and Khieu Samphan vice-president in charge of foreign affairs. The CGDK 
37 Hood/ Ablin 1987:xlvi cited Shawcross 1984:393.
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was recognised as legitimate government by the UN, ASEAN, China, and the United States; 
the government took the seat at the United Nations. On the other side of the CGDK and the 
international supporters stood Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and the KPRP government. Thai-
land was an important channel to fund the resistance groups. Serge Thion, writing in 1987, 
said that ‘nowadays the Khmer resistance groups, the Khmer Rouge included, are under com-
plete control of the Thai military’ (Thion 1987:151). 
This formation remained essentially in place until 1991. Although the United States provided 
direct support for KPNLF and FUNCINPEC/ANS, this indirectly benefited the Khmer Rouge 
as it bolstered the CGDK as a whole. While Pol Pot’s communists had support among the 
poor peasantry, FUNCINPEC had a large peasant following itself owing to Sihanouk’s tradi-
tional royalist appeal among the peasantry. The followers of the KPNLF were made up of 
republicans who had fled the Khmer Rouge. Thus the diverse coalition government was 
united only in its aim to get rid of the Vietnamese-installed government. Apart from that, they 
continued fighting each other. When the domestic military situation jammed in the mid-1980s 
and a victory of either side was not in sight, a solution became possible. At the same time, 
Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost led to a cut in ideological and material backing of Viet-
nam and its Cambodian occupation as Gorbachev aimed at rapprochement with China. 
Consequently, facing an economic crisis and being unable to support its presence in Cambo-
dia on its own, Vietnam announced to withdraw from Cambodia. In 1989, as a sign of coop-
eration, the KPRP renamed the People’s Republic of Kampuchea politically neutral the State 
of Cambodia (SOC). In 1991, the KPRP was renamed Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). Af-
ter a series of setbacks all parties signed the UN negotiated Peace Accords at the Paris confer-
ence from 21st to 23rd October 1991, which formed the basis for the UN peacekeeping mission 
UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia). Shortly before the Paris Con-
ference, a Supreme National Council (SNC) was formed to represent Cambodia’s sovereignty 
during the UN mission. The SNC consisted of representatives of both governments, the CPP 
and the exile-based CGDK. Sihanouk was appointed president. According to the regulations 
in the Paris Peace Accords, the SNC, through a transfer of the prime governmental authority 
to UNTAC, legitimises UNTAC’s operation and itself retains a largely representative role and 
integrating function.
2.3.3. Changes and continuities through times of war and violence
The post-1979 period saw the reconstruction of social ties and economic activity in the areas 
under the control of the Phnom Penh government. At the same time, the KPRP re-introduced
a system of social control, which saw the penetration of party organisation all the way down 
to the village level, which again became the basic territorial and socio-political unit. This sys-
tem of control provided the basis for the CPP’s control of the local level of government dur-
ing and after UNTAC. Therefore, the KPRP leaders, many of them former Khmer Rouge, 
kept the ideal of socialist party organisation alive and within the offices of the new state re-
constructed patronage networks while rolling back collectivisation of the Pol Pot state. These 
networks included both the new KPRP elite as well as members of the old elite in the form of 
loyal Buddhists, on top of them Tep Vong, a Hun Sen loyalist, who had testified against the 
Khmer Rouge in the 1979 trial. Given the continuity of the political and religious elite in the 
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post-1979 and post-1993 political systems and the functional links between the political and 
Buddhist leadership until 1975 and after 1979, it is significant to note that during his time as 
leader of the united sangha, Tep Vong argued that forms of political violence may be con-
doned by Buddhism (Harris 2001:93). This is to say that, similar to the Sihanouk state, Bud-
dhism functioned again as legitimising factor for the political powerholders, yet this time not 
in the form of the Buddhist kingship, but in the form of a ‘semisocialist’ (Ebihara 1987:35-36) 
programme. 
At the same time, the violent political contest continued, pitting the various parties against 
each other, including the continuation of a violent anti-Vietnamese sentiment, which until 
today is present in the political pronouncements of Sam Rainsy. As a consequence, the Pol 
Pot era and the Vietnamese-installed government provided the basis for long-lasting fears and 
threat perceptions among sections of the Cambodian population against each other and out-
side nations, and according political alignments. 
As we shall see, UNTAC did not manage to bridge these fissures within the Cambodian popu-
lace, partly because it did not intend to do so in the first place but aimed at removing the in-
ternational dimension from the conflict and pacify the region in the process. The KPRP/CPP
patronage structure and control over the central ministries including the security forces re-
mained untouched. 
2.4. The Paris Peace Agreements and UNTAC: Content and Implementation 
2.4.1. Repatriation and rehabilitation
One of UNTAC’s tasks was to repatriate and resettle between 350,000 and 370,000 refugees 
from the camps at the Thai border and resettle around 170,000 refugees within Cambodia. 
Repatriation was seen as precondition for Cambodia’s reconstruction and national reconcilia-
tion, for the ‘rehabilitation of the country’s human and physical infrastructure’ as basis for 
economic reconstruction (Heininger 1994:47). Mining areas and an insufficient transport net-
work were seen as greatest impediments to the task of repatriation (Heininger 1994:48). 
According to Heininger, a number of problems prevented the successful completion of the 
repatriation mandate. In order to ease reintegration of the refugees, UNTAC planned to sup-
ply them with a house frame, tools, moskito nets, water buckets, and food for twelve months 
supplied through the World Food Programme until the resettled population could grow their 
own food on their newly allocated land (2ha for an average family of 4.4 persons). However, 
there was not sufficient supply of land: first, mining was more serious than thought; second, 
arable land was in short supply; third, land with previous titles was too expensive to buy; 
fourth, 80 percent of refugees asked to be resettled in the four provinces along the Thai bor-
der. Only 60 percent of these refugees had lived in these provinces before. These provinces, in 
addition, were strongholds of the civil war parties opposing the Phnom Penh government after 
1979 and therefore had the greatest densitiy of landmines.38 UNICEF reported that ‘approx-
38 Heininger 1994:50-51 and ibid.:51 cited Kamm 1992:Section 1: 22.
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imately 76 per cent of the returnees opted to settle in the four Northwestern provinces, with 
60 per cent coming to the provinces of Battambang and Banteay Meanchey. This rapid popu-
lation increase of over 22 percent for each of these 2 provinces has placed a considerable bur-
den on the resources of the farming communities where the returnees have been resettled. It 
has also added pressure to already strained government health, water and sanitation services’ 
(UNICEF 1996:21). 
The allocation of land and other aids to the resettled population incited resentments among the 
original population against the refugees, which returned to Cambodia from one of the eight 
refugee camps and often found themselves in a better position regarding international help as 
opposed to the local population.39 This also meant a mix of regional subcultures in Cambodia, 
which became mixed when people had first started to flee their areas of origin to settle some-
where else. These also produced resentments owing to different mentalities and perceptions 
influenced by mutual prejudices.40 Another difficult problem for the returnees was the reset-
tlement in villages, sometimes their former ones, but especially new ones where no support of 
remaining family members could be expected. A report on returnees in Battambang province 
describes how returning refugees without wielding own prestige found it difficult to have ac-
cess to social capital and establish networks to persons of reputation in the village in order to 
become integrated into the community and gain access to cooperative work teams (provas 
dei). They were therefore likely to be excluded from village life and often had to live hand-to-
mouth, unable to participate in the exchange of goods or line up for support channelled 
through development assistance. A problem in this was that returnees lacked patronage links 
either because kin ties were cut during the upheavals of the civil war, or because in new vil-
lages they did not have anyone to support them. Missing thus status and the opportunity to 
attach themselves to persons of status, returnees often were no longer integrated into the 
community through traditional patterns of patronage. For them, links to persons outside the 
village became crucial to maintain or enhance their standards of living, thus opening the vil-
lage conflict management to outside influences. In addition, on return to their native village, 
demobilised soldiers and refugees found it difficult to integrate due to changes in attitude or a 
loss of farming skills. ‘The difficulties of coping with individuals socialised to the life of a 
jungle base, within the confines of a village, is a likely source of conflict. The different re-
sources and norms that these individuals bring into the village with them, and their relative 
detachment from the informal structure of village control, may render village-based conflict 
management customs less effective in dealing with these relative outsiders. The investment in 
symbolic capital which is the basis of village community relationships may not be valued by 
these individuals, either because they are accustomed to living in military communities which 
operate according to quite different norms, or because they have other resources, such as 
weapons, which make investment in intangible assets unnecessary.’41
39 Heininger 1994:51 cited Kamm 1992: Section 1: 22.
40 Interview with a human rights NGO director in Phnom Penh, 1 June 2007.
41 Hughes 2001:22; ibid.:11-12 cited Davenport/ Healy/ Malone 1995:67; Hughes 2001:19 cited Vijghen 
1996:16.
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In relation to the problems of patronage and resettlement, UNICEF reported that village 
communities tended to move together if possible, keeping the same leader and the same iden-
tity when ‘forced to join other villages in a camp for displaced persons.’ UNICEF observed 
the same pattern of groups, which returned from the Thai refugee camps. These groups, when 
able to, kept their leaders and ‘tended to remain outside the existing CPP network’, which 
they found in the communities in which they resettled (UNICEF 1996:39). 
2.4.2. Civil administration, police and military
UNTAC’s civil administration part listed three levels of cooperation between the UN and 
Cambodian authorities: 
first, ‘direct control’ through the Special Representative Yasushi Akashi over the ministries of 
foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information ‘to ensure strict neu-
trality’ (Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, An-
nex 1, Section B, paragraph 1; Report of the Secretary-General 1992:paragraph 94); 
second, ‘optional control’ over the areas of ‘public health, education, agriculture, maritime 
and riverine fisheries, communications and post, energy production and distribution, naviga-
ble waters and public transport, tourism and historical monuments, mines and general admini-
stration’ (Second Progress Report 1992:paragraph 38) in accordance with the Agreement on a 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 1, Section B, paragraph 
2. This provision concerned the control over all facilities and institutions that could influence 
the election outcome: see Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambo-
dia Conflict, Annex 1, Section B, paragraph 3;
third, ‘general supervision’ over all remaining areas (Agreement on a Comprehensive Politi-
cal Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 1, Section B, paragraph 3).
UNTAC’s core problem was its failure to gain control of the administration of the State of 
Cambodia including the security apparatus and key ministries as it was planned in the Paris 
agreements. Consequently, Hun Sen and the security forces under his control were able to 
retain a scope of action sufficient to refuse cooperation with the UN troops and ensure their 
political survival post UNTAC. It was this exclusive access to the resources of power which 
enabled the CPP to maintain the strongest position during and after UNTAC despite its loss of 
the elections in 1993. Instrumental in this political feature are three characteristics of Cambo-
dia’s political culture: an ‘elite authoritarianism, narrow vested interests, and deeply en-
trenched systems of patronage and clientelism’ in a pyramid structure, which is kept in shape 
through the role of ‘patronage and clientelism in government and in personal relations, and 
the distribution of power based on rewards for loyalty’ between the politicians on top and the 
support base on the lower echelons of the patronage pyramid (Roberts 2002:520+525).
The police component established a Civilian Police (CIVPOL), an unarmed UN police force. 
Its task was ‘to supervise or control the local police in order to ensure that law and order are 
maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
fully protected. [...] Their activities will focus upon the activities of the local police function-
ing out of the existing or established police posts or stations’ (Report of the Secretary-General 
1992:paragraph 124; Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia 
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Conflict, Annex 1, Section B, paragraph 5b). Accordingly, CIVPOL was supposed to acquaint 
Cambodian police with human rights, basic freedoms, as well as certain procedures of police 
investigation (Report of the Secretary-General 1992:paragraph 126/127). 
The military component was to supervise the pacification of Cambodia, including demobilisa-
tion and disarmament of the civil war parties (Report of the Secretary-General, 1992: para-
graph 54), and help with release of prisoners of war and repatriation of refugees. As politi-
cally sensitive undertaking, a Mixed Military Working Group was staffed with representatives 
of all civil war parties.42 However, the refusal of the Khmer Rouge to disarm 70 percent of 
their soldiers, canton the remaining 30 percent, give up secret weapons storage, plus their
withdrawal from the Supreme National Council in April 1993, were serious set backs for 
UNTAC. In addition, the Khmer Rouge attempted to expand control over countryside areas. 
Overall, of the 155,000 combatants, UNTAC managed to demobilise 36,000 combatants be-
tween the Paris agreements in 1991 and May 1993 (Escola de cultura de pau 2006). The 
Royal Government of Cambodia notes different numbers, however: Given the non-
cooperation of the Khmer Rouge, until May 1993, about 50,000 of the planned 140,000 sol-
diers were demobilised from the three factions cooperating with UNTAC (Royal Government 
of Cambodia 1996:5). There were no coordinated efforts, as each army pursued its own de-
mobilisation plan. The State of Cambodia provided three months of salary and transportation 
to the soldiers’ ‘district of their choice. Once there, district officials were supposed to monitor 
and and support their reintegration, but this does not appear to have happened’ (Royal Gov-
ernment of Cambodia 1996:5).
Reintegration programmes did not follow the demobilisation prgrammes: short-term business 
and literacy skills were carried out by ILO and UNESCO while soldiers were in cantonment, 
and follow-up programmes by ILO had limited impact partly owing to the fact that ‘demobi-
lized soldiers proved difficult to work with’ (Royal Government of Cambodia 1996:5).
Prum Sam Ol notes that social capital and relations to persons of repute was critical of 
whether the soldier could demobilise successfully or not:
“The key distinction was whether the soldier was from their village or not. If he was, then there 
was no problem with him coming back because this was his home and he had relatives to take 
care of him. Even if he had no land, he could work for other families who knew his family. 
However, soldiers from other villages should not come because there was no land and no jobs 
and they would have no one to depend on.”43
CIVPOL and the military component are the most unsuccessful parts of UNTAC, due to in-
sufficient qualifications in the areas of language skills, differences in knowledge on human 
rights within the national contingents of UNTAC, understaffing, and insufficient equipment. 
This impacted negatively on the security of returnees, pursuit of human rights violations, or 
control of local police forces (Heininger 1994:79). A further problem was a lack of means of 
42 Report of the Secretary-General 1992:paragraph 55/56; Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement 
of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 2, Art. X-XII.
43 Hughes 2001:12 cited Prum Sam Ol/ Peng Chiew Meng/ Elizabeth Uphoff Cato 1996:25.
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integration for demobilised soldiers, which partly led to the formation of marauding gangs 
(Lulei/ Weidemann 1998:364).
Continued recruitment of soldiers after 1993 made continued demobilisation efforts neces-
sary. Between 1996 and 1999, the government carried out a Reduction in Force Exercise to 
demobilise 40,000 soldiers until December 1998, flanked by a Veterans Assistance Program. 
The overall aim was to save 25.44 million US Dollar, transfer them to the social sectors, and 
‘improve the functioning of the security apparatus through increased discipline and motiva-
tion. A professionalization of the RCAF [Royal Cambodian Armed Forces] will take place 
and be reflected, inter alia, by the provision that all RCAF soldiers should be full-time’ 
(Royal Government of Cambodia 1996:2). 
To do so, vulnerable or unreliable groups made up the crucial portion of those to be demobi-
lised, indicating that the RCAF after 1993 was a reservoir for all sorts of people whether fit
for the army or not (perhaps this mirrors government policy until 1995, that all university 
graduates were guaranteed a job in the state bureaucracy: UNICEF, 1996: 22). The demobi-
lised consisted of 4000 disabled, 3000 chronically ill, 1250 aged, 1750 widows, 800 female 
soldiers, 6000 Khmer Rouge defectors (Royal Government of Cambodia 1996:2+8). A survey 
of these groups shows that 54 percent of them had no house, 49 percent no assets, 59 percent
no livestock, 66 percent had no land, 15 percent were separated, widowed or divorced, 57 
percent had a deceased father, 52 percent had primary or less education, 53 percent had no 
economic experience, 37 percent had no marketable skills, 11 percent had poor health (Royal 
Government of Cambodia 1996:8-9). Based on an average household size of 5.5 persons, the 
programme implied the resettlement of 220.000 people. The Veterans Assistance Program 
was meant to carry the social costs: a ‘monetised departure allowance’ of 898 US Dollar to be 
paid in two instalments: at departure and three months after; services to vulnerable groups 
such as medical care and land; vocational training; resettlement and a shareholder scheme for 
landless civilians (Royal Government of Cambodia 1996:2-3). Demobilisation was made dif-
ficult by the fact that economic growth during the UNTAC phase was between 4 and 8 per-
cent, but most of it centred in Phnom Penh owing to the service sector catering to UNTAC 
personnel with ‘little impact on the rest of the country’.44
So this was the situation which demobilised soldiers had to face: an economic upturn based 
on Phnom Penh and confined to the service industry; and 85 percent of the population living 
in the countryside characterised by a lack of infrastructure with roads absent or in a poor state, 
lack of services, and lack of security given continued fighting and banditry. Land in this situa-
tion ‘is the single most important asset – economically, socially and psychologically – but 
little arable land remains available. What has not been claimed already is unusable due to in-
security or land mines’ (Royal Government of Cambodia 1996:5). The situation was aggra-
vated by competition with those 350,000 to 370,000 people that had been resettled from the
refugee camps at the Thai border and the resettlement of the 170,000 internally displaced 
people during UNTAC (Royal Government of Cambodia 1996:9). The report gives further 
strength to the argument cited above that soldiers lack support networks in the villages they 
44 Royal Government of Cambodia 1996:5; UNICEF 1996:25-27.
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were resettled in during the demobilisation under UNTAC. For the 1996-1999 programme, 
the government reported that ‘many veterans lack the social assets that are of central impor-
tance to back-up their survival strategy. These assets include […] a positive and supportive 
local community and networks of family and relatives’ (Royal Government of Cambodia 
1996:9).
On 30 April 1999, simultaneously to the stabilisation of the political system between 1998
and 1999 (second election won by the CPP, local power sharing agreement CPP-
FUNCINPEC, dissolution of the Khmer Rouge, introduction of the Senat. For details see 
Chapter 3) demobilisation programmes continued (Keng Menglang 2003:23note22): the year 
1999 saw a reduction of the military expenditures to put more funds into the budgets for 
health, education and rural development. In 2000, the government planned to demobilise 
31,500 soldiers within a three-year phase: between May and July 2000, a pilot demobilisation 
programme was carried out in the four provinces of Kampot, Kampong Thom, Banteay 
Meanchey and Battambang to demobilise the first 1,500 soldiers in cooperation with the 
World Bank, the UN World Food Programme and the bilateral donors Japan, Sweden and the 
Netherlands, who contributed a sum of 2.25 million US Dollars. The pilot programme was 
followed by a first demobilisation phase between 15 October and 26 December 2001, during 
which 15,000 soldiers were demobilised in ten provinces under a World Bank loan of 18.4 
million US Dollar (the Cambodia Demobilization and Reintegration Project, CDRP): Kam-
pong Chhnang, Kampong Speu, Kampot, Kampong Cham, Kandal, Battambang, Banteay 
Meanchey, Siem Reap, Kampong Thom, and Steung Treng. The second phase targeting the 
remaining 15,000 soldiers under the World Bank programme began in March 2002 and was to 
be concluded in June of the same year. However, the plan was delayed for two years due to a 
World Bank investigation into misuse of 6.9 million US Dollar for the procurement of motor-
cycles. The project was subsequently halted and the implicated firms and individuals were 
barred from further participating in the demobilisation programme.45 The project was closed 
on 31 December 2004. In January 2005, the Cambodian government paid back 2.8 million US 
Dollar to the World Bank.46 In October 2006, the Vietnamese News Agency reported that 
‘Cambodia plans to demobilise 30,000 soldiers, but the plan has not yet been implemented. 
Donors cut off funds for the project due to accusation of corruption’ (Vietnam News Agency
25 October 2006).
Crucially, civil society was not involved in the demobilisation programmes. Consequently, 
there was also no discourse forthcoming on military reform, demobilisation and reintegration 
of excombattants. A problem of the first demobilisation phase was slow disbursement of al-
lowance packages to demobilised soldiers, which was seen as potential threat to military re-
form (Kao Kim Hourn 2002:1-2). After the Paris agreements of 1991, the Cambodian army 
was not slimmed down, but instead was enlarged to incorporate the armed factions of the civil 
war parties with the exception of the Khmer Rouge. A second enlargement took place in 1998 
45 For a list of individuals and firms barred from the demobilisation programme see World Bank, 2004. 
46 World Bank 2004; World Bank 2005; Kao Kim Hourn 2002:1; Working Group for Weapons Reduction
2002:2; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004:1; Escola de cultura de pau 2006; BBC 29 May 
2006.
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to integrate those Khmer Rouge soldiers, who had defected to Hun Sen (Kao Kim Hourn 
2002:1+3). While the Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGRW), which monitored 
the first phase of the demobilisation, found no difficulties with the cash disbursement of 
946,800 Riels to the soldiers in addition to food, clothing and household items distributed by 
the World Food Programme, it found that the ex-soldiers had serious doubts about their secu-
rity and economic prospects: 67 percent of demobilised soldiers believed that weapons and 
explosives may not be handed in but may be hidden by soldiers; 24 percent were worried 
about banditry and other criminals who had managed to hide weapons from the current and 
earlier weapons collection programmes, and they also feared theft from these persons after 
having received their allowance; 6 percent of soldiers said that they would keep weapons if 
allowed in order to protect their families and properties as ‘they did not have confidence in 
the ability of local authorities or security forces to provide adequate security and safety when 
they return to their communities.’ Interestingly, in an apparent expression of mistrust for state 
agencies, soldiers ‘called on the police and courts not to set criminals free when arrested, in 
order to curb violence and promote the rule of law’ (Working Group for Weapons Reduction 
2002:4-5). Again, being resettled in their community provided a source of ambiguity: while 
75 percent of the soldiers surveyed were happy to be demobilised, 70 percent were worried 
about how to make a living, and an unspecified number was worried that the community they 
were going to be resettled in might discriminate them: ‘They feared that other civilians will 
look down on them after they loose the power they had as soldiers. They requested the gov-
ernment to ensure that demobilized soldiers will be safe in their communities’ (Working 
Groups for Weapons Reduction 2002:5-6). Once again, concerns about community support 
along with personal and economic insecurity occupied the minds of demobilised soldiers nine 
years after the first demobilisation efforts under UNTAC.47
Apart from a downsizing of the army, reintegration into society needs to be accompanied by a 
set of measures, which involve civil society and enhance acceptance in society of former sol-
diers. Kao Kim Hourn lists a number of points to consider. Among them are:
» improving relations between civil society and military to better root the army in society 
and subject it to democratic control by National Assembly and Senate; 
» improving reintegration of former soldiers into local communities through enhanced 
cooperation between government, donor countries, civil society and local authorities 
with particular consideration ‘of the most vulnerable group of demobilized soldiers, 
such as those who are handicapped, chronically ill, women and children’ (Kao Kim 
Hourn 2002:6);
» providing training skills for integration into the existing labour market;
» providing access to information on demobilisation and reintegration measures to secure 
popular support and trust between population and demobilised soldiers; 
» destroying weapons (Kao Kim Hourn 2002:4-8).
47 For administrative details see the evaluation report on the pilot demobilisation programme: General Secreta-
riat of the Council for the Demobilization of Armed Forces, 2001. 
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The list shows that not only demobilised adult soldiers, but also child soldiers did not receive 
governmental reintegration support according to their needs. According to a brief by the 
Escola de cultura de pau, a joint programme of the government and UNICEF in 2001 to pro-
vide education to child soldiers was announced by UNICEF as failed in 2002 due to a lack of 
funds (Escola de cultura de pau 2006:2). Continued relative political instability as manifested 
in politically motivated murders (such as that of trade union leader Chea Vichea in 2004) and 
the politically motivated prevention of a societal discourse by keeping control of the history 
curriculum in schools made it difficult if not impossible for demobilised soldiers to acknowl-
edge their past doings publicly for fear of retribution and through that achieve their reintegra-
tion. This made the governmental integration efforts more difficult (Barnitz/ Path/ Catalla 
2001:4).
2.4.3. Elections
The aim of the elections was to create a constituent assembly. The assembly was to work out 
a constitution within three months after the elections, adopt it with a two-thirds majority, turn 
itself into a legislative assembly and elect a government. The new constitution was to ensh-
rine human rights, neutrality, and liberal pluralist democracy (Agreement on a Comprehen-
sive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Art. 12-14, Art. 23 and Annex 5).
A division line between FUNCINPEC and CPP was the self-identification: whereas FUN-
CINPEC based its claim to power in its fight against the Vietnamese occupation, the CPP 
viewed the entire opposition as hostile. Hun Sen believed that the CPP’s control over the pop-
ulation through party-building activities combined with attacks against the opposition would 
automatically bring about election victory (Frieson 1996:184). While the CPP saw the Khmer 
Rouge as disintegrating force allied to FUNCINPEC, FUNCINPEC viewed as enemy Viet-
namese civilians and former soldiers in the country, which it deemed to undermine Cambo-
dian sovereignty. The issue was that FUNCINPEC shared anti-Vietnamese positions with the 
Khmer Rouge, whose attacks against the Vietnamese minority did not elicit protest in FUN-
CINPEC (Frieson 1996:184-185). 
Military attacks became more frequent the more the election date approached. Nevertheless, 
UNTAC was able to register about 90 percent of the 4.7 million eligible voters (with the ex-
ception of the Khmer Rouge controlled areas: the population residing there also had no possi-
bility to vote: Amer 1995:56). However, during a meeting of the Supreme National Council in 
April 1993, the UN’s special representative stated that the conditions for fair elections were 
absent. These conditions comprised areas such as a peaceful atmosphere, equal opportunities 
for all parties to compete in the elections, equal access to state media and other state resources
of the State of Cambodia for campaigning (Vorun/ Chhim 1998:421).
The elections from 23-28 May 1993 were relatively peaceful, however. The voter turn-out 
was around 90 percent, 20 parties competed (of which most could only form under the UN 
mission) for 120 seats. FUNCINPEC chaired by Sihanouk’s son Ranariddh won with 45.5 
percent and 58 seats. The CPP under Chea Sim won only 38.2 percent and 51 seats. Son 
Sann’s Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party BLDP, a splinter of KPNLF, won 3.8 percent and 
10 seats (Vorun/ Chhim 1998:424-425). The result is the more stunning as the CPP controlled 
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the largest part of Cambodia. Moreover, the majority of the population lived in its area of in-
fluence (Amer 1995:57). 
The constituent assembly now had to form a government to replace the State of Cambodia. As 
no party had the absolute majority, a coalition had to be found all the while the CPP was set to 
save at least a part of its power. CPP threats to resort to military force would have resulted in 
a renewed civil war. The CPP also demanded a repetition of elections in at least four provinc-
es, in which FUNCINPEC had won a majority, alleging unregularities. But since UNTAC had 
labelled the elections as free and fair and did not see repeated elections necessary, the CPP 
refused to hand over power and declared six provinces bordering Vietnam independent from 
the central government. This move was also motivated by the fear to become victim of retri-
butions should it hand over power to opposition parties (Vorun/ Chhim 1998 427-428). 
During the first session of the constituent assembly on 14 June 1993, Sihanouk was unanim-
ously elected provisional president. He then formed an all-party provisional government. To 
elicit cooperation from the CPP, the position of co-prime minister was created for Hun Sen, 
creating a double leadership with Ranariddh. The constituent assembly approved the provi-
sional government on 1 July 1993. This abolished the 1989 State of Cambodia and the 1989 
constitution. The new constitution was adopted on 21 September 1993. On 24 September 
1993, Sihanouk was elected king by the Council of the Throne. The constitution created the 
offices of a first and second prime minister to replace the co-prime ministers, thus further di-
viding power between FUNCINPEC and CPP (Vorun/ Chhim 1998:433). Ranariddh became 
first, Hun Sen second prime minister. 
2.4.4. Consequences of the peace agreements for fractions, continuities, and path depen-
dencies
Repatriations produced frictions between resettled populations and old inhabitants, problems 
of support for returnees owing to a lack of family members and their social networks, i.e. a 
lack of patronage links for resettled people. While exogenous marriage was practiced before 
the war and politicians campaigned in the rural areas for a seat in the national assembly, the 
village was now further linked to the outside through support resettled people had to find out-
side the village. In addition, demobilised soldiers perturbated village life through their differ-
ent norms, thus making intra-village conflict settlement and social cohesion less consistent.  
In addition, the double power structure inside the state institutions through the power sharing 
between FUNCINPEC and CPP opened the political system to violent competition between 
the erstwhile winners of the Pol Pot ouster (CPP) and their long-time royalist adversaries of 
FUNCINPEC. With the CPP holding on to control over the key ministries and the security
apparatus, FUNCINPEC had to rely on the CPP abiding by the rules of the democratic game, 
while at the same time broadening their patron-client networks. The political competition that 
ensued at the top thus traveled downwards along party patronage lines into the villages, where 
it met CPP-appointed village chiefs. 
It is here that Chap Sotharith, Executive Director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation 
and Peace mentioned that today in the villages ‘it is all party politics’, complaining that in 
some instances, members of opposing parties are not even invited to weddings in their vil-
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lage.48 Hence it can be argued that while these points of cohesion were reconstructed after 
1979, their role then experienced a degree of alteration by drawing village administration into 
the wider state bureaucracy. Political discrimination continues to the present day. When striv-
ing through Phnom Penh or the countryside, roadsides are sometimes plastered with party 
signs of FUNCINPEC, CPP, SRP, and NRP, showing support for the respective party. Inabil-
ity to work with each other was assigned by interviewees to continued enemy perceptions of 
political opponents as legacy of the war in combination with attempts to keep the wealth and 
power acquired through war times by the ruling party after 1979.49 In December 2004, it was 
reported that village chiefs ‘have not been selected by the Commune Councils, as provided 
for in the Law on Commune Administration of 2001. Instead, a formula is under discussion 
whereby 70 per cent of the chiefs will be appointed by CPP and 30 per cent by FUNCINPEC’ 
(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2004:6). The local elec-
tions of April 2007 in theory assigned SRP the power to choose their own village leaders to 
replace CPP village leaders. It is not clear yet, however, if SRP is prepared to exercise this 
right as it would constitute a severe challenge to the rural CPP strongholds and therefore a 
direct attack on the position of the CPP (see also Chapter 3.2.2.). In 2006, the elections 
watchdog COMFREL published a statement criticising the Guideline of the Ministry of Inte-
rior on Village Chief Selection Procedure (No 004 of 4 March 2006) ‘that has never been 
publicly consulted, for comments and inputs from the public, NGOs, and other stakeholders.’ 
The guideline suggests village chiefs to be selected through a vote of commune councillors, 
of which there are five to eleven in each commune. COMFREL suspects therefore that the 
village chief ‘shall not become [a] village representative’ (COMFREL 2006). 
This mirrors the political importance conveyed upon village chiefs by the central administra-
tion. In 1995, Davenport, Healy and Malone wrote:
“Villages are connected to the administrative structure of the province through the village leader 
[who] is a political appointee. Often the same man had held this role since 1979. Village leaders 
tend to have much more land than most other villagers. They have the task of ensuring that vil-
lage recruits are available for conscription and for public work tasks. They distribute firearms 
(20 to 30 a village) to those men they trust to protect the village from dangers. They control vil-
lage land where it is still available for newly married couples, demobilised soldiers and others 
with special needs or deserving special favours.”50
It is significant that the political contest of the first post-UNTAC government was about the 
influence of CPP and FUNCINPEC on the local level of government, which was (and is) 
dominated by the CPP and forms the core component of Hun Sen’s ability to remain prime 
minister through successive election victories – helped financially by his extensive network-
ing skills with the business oligarchy. As we shall see, the one element in eliminating the 
power struggle between CPP and FUNCINPEC in 1997-1998 was a power sharing agreement 
for the communes.  
48 Interview in Phnom Penh, 6 June 2007.
49 Interview with Chap Sotharith, 6 June 2007, and interview with the director of a non-Cambodian NGO in 
Phnom Penh, 21 May 2007. See also Caroline Hughes and Kim Sedara, 2004
50 Hughes 2001:17-18 cited Davenport/ Healy/ Malone 1995:65.
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Therefore, the control of the village level by the central government remained a key compo-
nent in the execution of political control. With the assumption of office of the socialist gov-
ernment under Heng Samrin in 1979, Cambodian society was reorganised along patterns of 
patron client relations under party control. UNTAC enforced this development after 1991, 
since the transformation processes in politics, economy and society did not take place as 
planned but instead were adapted to patronage politics from the central to the local level once 
UNTAC had left. The inability of UNTAC to wean control away from the CPP during the 
transition period therefore allowed a restauration of traditional social relations, which then 
fully developed unter the CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition.51 To the present day, the villages are 
rife with political distrust between adherents of the CPP versus adherents of FUNCINPEC 
and Sam Rainsy Party, which can be seen as a direct result and lasting legacy of the war.
This conflict situation was enforced by the problem that the Paris agreements were not pri-
marily designed to introduce democratic reforms and create a social basis for the UNTAC-
sponsored transformation process. Rather, the overall goal was to de-escalate the international 
dimension of the Cambodia conflict. Therefore, the consideration of external goals was put 
above the domestic crisis, which continued to unfold into new patterns after the externally 
intiated peace-building process (for instance Roberts 2002:522). As a result, when UNTAC 
withdrew, the international community left behind a half-hearted attempt of a formal democ-
ratic system. This system was characterised by traditional forms of political legitimacy and an 
elite, which ensured its political survival by occupying material and immaterial resources. 
Without any further help from outside, it was up to the political elites to adapt the democratic 
institutions to the political, military, social, economic, cultural and diplomatic realities of 
Cambodia.52
The hot-tempered atmosphere during the first post-war government from 1993 to 1998 was 
only cooled in 1998, when the political system stabilised in favour of Prime Minister Hun 
Sen. Consequently, the period after 1998 also saw a reduction in politically motivated vi-
olence, especially during elections. Chapter 3 will elaborate on these issues.
2.5. Summary: Violence and Legitimacy of Rule
The break-in of the Vietnam War into Cambodia intensified the violence executed by an au-
thoritarian state in pursuit of its political and social aims: while anti-communist under repub-
lican Lon Nol, it was anti-republican under communist Pol Pot. In the former case, state vi-
olence was used in order to root out communists. In the latter case, violence was used to root 
out bourgeois elements. Violence by the communist regime was carried out both against its 
opponents outside the party and in factional struggles within the party. Executions became 
commonplace, fear and distrust were consciously spread in order to impose communist party 
authority over the population, political killings were not rarely a pretext to get rid of a person-
al fiend. Corvée labour became a means of punishment for alleged or real enemies of the 
51 Curtis 1998:32 cited Heder 1995:19.
52 Curtis 1998:32 cited Heder 1995:19.
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communist state, and new patronage relationships were established to favour the new elite 
under Pol Pot. 
The regime collapsed when Vietnam intervened. While the intervention stopped Pol Pot’s 
violent excesses, it triggered a civil war that was to last officially until 1991. Unable to seize 
control of the state’s power resources, UNTAC was unable to reconcile the civil war parties 
and stop political violence. The political set-up that was reached after 1979, the hostility be-
tween CPP, FUNCINPEC, and the Khmer Rouge, continued into the UNTAC and post-
UNTAC phases. Politically-motivated killings were used in order to maintain the status quo 
from the CPP’s point of view, or to change it from the other’s point of view. 
The almost permanent movement of people within Cambodia since the 1970s, either as refu-
gees, as relocatees moved by Pol Pot, or as returnees under UNTAC also meant that the ho-
mogenous pre-war village life was severely disrupted. Foreign communities had moved into 
villages with intact networks of patronage. Compensation packages for returnees after the war 
produced friction between old and new inhabitants. Village life became politicised, with new 
and old inhabitants, and CPP and FUNCINPEC adherents eying each other suspiciously. 
As under Sihanouk, Lon Nol, and Pol Pot rule was secured through control over the security 
forces and networks of patronage tailor-made for the new regime. The CPP, coming to power 
in 1979, eradicated Pol Pot’s networks and put its own in place with the help of its socialist 
party organisation, thereby creating the basis for its stay in power until the present day. 
3. Intersections of Post-war Transformations: Old Parties, New Democracy
3.1. Old political culture, new government structures: traditional concepts of 
power and rule meet external demands for democracy and marketisation
The new constitution re-established the Kingdom of Cambodia, but this time the king’s pow-
ers were limited:
“vastly different from the old monarchical constitution, according to which the constitution was 
‘granted’ by the king, articles 135-138 of the new charter make it clear, that the new constitu-
tion and parliament exist before the king and that he is chosen by them (Vickery 1994).”
The provisions of the constitution made it explicit that the king shall ‘reign’ but not ‘govern’ 
(Art. 7), he is appointed (Art. 10), and succession is decided by the Royal Council of the 
Throne (Art. 13).53 The regulation that members of the government must be members of the 
political parties represented in the national assembly excluded the Khmer Rouge (Frost
1994:88). Art. 157 (previously Art. 138), which stipulates that the king appoints the first and 
second prime minister, ‘raised serious questions about adherence to democratic majority-rule 
53 Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia. The constitution was amended in 1999. Where articles changed 
from the original constitution, this is indicated. The Council of the Throne consists of the president of the 
senate, the president of the national assembly, the prime minister, the supreme monks of the orders of Mo-
hanikay and Thammayut, the first and second vice-president of the senate, and the first and second vice-
president of the national assembly.
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procedures. The distinction between […] Ranariddh and […] Hun Sen proved to be primarily 
in protocol rather than in power’ (Brown/ Zasfoll 1998:287)54
The particular power sharing structure between FUNCINPEC and CPP
“was meant to maintain in place the two traditional centers of gravity in Cambodian political 
life – the factional hierarchy and the monarchy – to the detriment of groups pressing for an ex-
pansion of the political franchise. This tension between the pressures for democratization gener-
ated by the elections and the efforts by the elites in power to contain any direct challenge to the 
social and political structures on which their authority rests set the trajectory of subsequent po-
litical developments in Cambodia (Lizée 1996:83-84).”
The conception of democratic legitimisation through multiparty elections meant a ‘relegation 
of an elite used to absolutism to a seriously undermined and relatively powerless position in 
Khmer Politics’ (Roberts 2001:117). Similarly, Lizée notes, that ‘the idea of rooting political 
power in the concept of popular representation rather than in the complex of factional alle-
giances that have been traditionally dominated the nation’s political landscape was seen by 
the factional elites as inherently threatening to their authority’ (Lizée 1996:83). In addition, a 
highly personalised political style (Curtis 1998:27) centred decision making on a small group 
of individuals rather than on consultation with larger parts of the administration or party struc-
ture.
In this set up, the political elite was eager to control monks, which were ‘absorbed’ into the 
electorate after 1993 through the provision of universal adult suffrage (Kent 2006:354). The 
respect monks enjoy among the population made it therefore necessary for politicians to at-
tempt control over them and bathe in their popularity at the same time. As Kent notes about a 
visit to a pagoda in Takeo province: 
“At one rural pagoda I visited in Takeo province, the local people were complaining bitterly that 
their head monk was having his arm twisted to comply with the wishes of the village chief. The 
chief had insisted that the pagoda invite the prime minister to officiate at the consecration cere-
mony for a new building. The head monk and many of his congregation wanted to keep politi-
cians out of the pagoda, but they were afraid of ‘trouble’ and so they gave in. The middle-aged 
woman who told me about this explained that this would give the village chief an opportunity to 
win favour with the powerful, and that it would also give the politicians a chance to manipulate 
the villagers by offering gifts, demonstrating association with their pagoda and monks and pos-
sibly also striking fear into those who did not intend to repay the honour with loyalty. Her story 
portrays the monks as obeying the interests of worldly power-holders. This is a complete inver-
sion of Khmer ideals, according to which world sustenance depends on the righteousness of 
leaders who both support but also obey dhamma (Kent 2006:354).”
Roberts defines three central characteristics of the political system: first, attempts to create a 
balance of power between CPP and FUNCINPEC; second, power sharing arrangements 
54 As Brown and Zasloff (1998:287) mentioned, the International Republican Institute IRI (supported by the US 
Republican Party) regarded the coalition as undemocratic, since the equal division of power did not reflect 
the election outcome, and its inclusive character did not allow for a loyal opposition (ibid., note 25).  
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within the expanded polity (from a one-party system to a multi-party system) amidst demands 
from outside to slim down the bureacracy, which would leave loyal followers without posi-
tions to generate wealth and status. Hence, ‘[i]nstead of halving the numbers of CPP represen-
tatives to accommodate the Funcinpec arrivals, the CPP sought to preserve their positions and 
their clients who helped keep them there’; third, the high level of development aid, which 
vanished into the pockets of politicians and businessmen (Roberts 2002:521-522+526-527). 
Applied to popular elections, patron-client relations imply that 
“[t]he defeat of a key party such as the CPP had consequences far beyond its own immediate 
concerns. The networks that underpin political parties also suffer a loss of patronage, which in 
turn undermines client support, thus reinforcing the problem of preserving political power for 
the elites. […] In essence, the problem can in part be characterised as a lack of institutionalisa-
tion of political opposition. When removed from power, rather than facing the victor from the 
relative stable socio-economic position of a ‘loyal opposition’, a form of economic exile is pur-
suant (Roberts 2001:117).”
Additionally, informal patron-client relationships penetrated the bureaucracy and the political 
parties and thereby undermined the formal structure of authority: they were ‘disguised by 
formal facades in modern institutions’ on the national level and to a probably lesser extent on 
the local level (Scott 1972:92).
The new polity became characterized by a neo-patrimonialism, which after the effective of 
FUNCINPEC in the coup of 1997 centred on Hun Sen’s extended family network. Marriage 
policy ensures that Hun Sen’s influence is stay after his retirement (perhaps through death, 
given his announcement in early 2007 that he is to stay prime minister until he is 90 years 
old). What happens, therefore, is a depersonalisation of the patronage pyramid through a fa-
miliarisation of the political system (for further details see the Working Paper on youth vi-
olence in Cambodia, Chapter 5.1.).
3.2. Opposition, political dissent and society
3.2.1. Conflicts in the political system
Concerning the election outcome, a prevalent feeling among FUNCINPEC members was that 
their party’s victory at the polls had not resulted in appropriate change of the real power dis-
tribution throughout the country (Frost 1994:89). An equal division of the ministerial posts 
and their double-filling with personnel of CPP and FUNCINPEC presumably reinforced this 
feeling: ‘The relationship between minister and vice minister and the two under-secretaries of 
state was inherently political and thus served to preserve a party-based structure, rather than a 
true coalition or “government of national reconciliation”’ (Curtis 1998:22). Additionally, the 
administrative structure of the SOC down to the district level remained largely intact. There-
fore, the CPP personnel at all levels could retain the SOC system of information, influence, 
control, and patron-client relationships; as a result, even subordinate CPP staff in ministries 
and governor administrations was able to outweigh FUNCINPEC ministers and governors, 
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many of whom could not exercise appropriate control over their portfolios (Curtis 1998:23).55
Thus, ‘the CPP emerged as dominant in decision making and administration, particularly in 
the countryside. The bureaucracy, the security service, the army, and the judiciary continued 
being largely directed by former SOC cadres, loyal to the CPP leadership’ (Brown/ Zasloff
1998:287).56 The power sharing concept, introduced primarily to defuse the danger of CPP 
secessionism, therefore led to a ‘disquieting duality in the ranks of the country’s bureaucracy’ 
(Curtis 1998:16). For both parties the forming of the coalition meant to buy ‘themselves time 
to prepare for future political and electoral battles’ (Curtis 1998:19).    
After the 1998 elections, the political system was changed to adapt to the necessities of the 
patron-client system. UNTAC’s attempt to undermine this system can be regarded as a second 
attempt after the introduction of French parliamentarism in the late 1940s with a Democratic 
Party that was independent of clientelistic networks to win elections. Hun Sen’s bloody coup 
of 7 July 1997 against Ranarridh, executed with the aim to prevent the absorption of Khmer 
Rouge soldiers into the ranks of FUNCINPEC and thus the solidification of Ranarridh against 
Hun Sen, actively thwarted UNTAC’s attempt. In hindsight, therefore, UNTAC involuntarily 
contributed to a solidifying of patronage within the formal institutions of democracy. This 
system had to produce more work places for clients than the political system after 1993 could 
offer. The result was that the one-chamber parliament was expanded to two chambers by add-
ing a senate to the national assembly. This enabled the system to produce more wealth and 
status for individuals than before (Roberts 2002:532). 
This in turn meant that while the international community demanded market reforms along 
with a slim administration, the state administration became balooned to enable patrons to re-
ward their clients with positions of status (Kurtenbach 2006). However, the senate was not 
only meant to give the government space to breathe, but also to end the power struggle be-
tween CPP and FUNCINPEC. Through a system of patronge, the CPP controlled the local 
levels of government while refusing to hold local elections. This put FUNCINPEC at a disad-
vantage as there were not enough positions to reward local FUNCINPEC supporters with po-
sitions (Roberts 2002:527, 532, 529-533). The crisis was settled until May 1999, first with the 
introduction of the senate, then with a power sharing agreement between CPP and FUNCIN-
PEC in 1999 in relation to local government positions (Roberts 2002:532-533).
Domestically,
55 For more details on how the CPP excluded FUNCINPEC personnel from decision making, see ibid., 23-25. 
56 Finance Minister Sam Rainsy was most outspoken on this issue and in December 1993 commented FUN-
CINPEC’s attempts to adjust reality to the election outcome as ‘dismantling the “corrupt” and “authoritarian” 
structures inherited from the former regime […] “at the economic and political level”’ (Frost 1994:89). Ad-
ministrative changes at the provincial level meant that FUNCINPEC tried ‘to challenge long-established 
power structures of the CPP’ (Frost 1994:90). This also included the elaborate system of patron-client rela-
tions. However, as of 1997 – according to most observers – FUNCINPEC did not make significant inroads 
into the bureaucracy, which became more and more politicised through the appointment of loyal party mem-
bers to government posts (which resulted in an overstaffed administration), thus destroying hopes for the es-
tablishment of a professional and neutral civil service (Curtis 1998:25). A push for communal elections prior 
to the 1998 national elections to alter the power structure at the basis was blocked by the CPP and not carried 
out until February 2002 due to the fact that village authority and patronage systems influence electoral out-
comes at the national level (Um 1998:79).
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“the concept of a loyal opposition party – in contrast to a revolutionary opposition party – must 
be broadly accepted by the Cambodian political élites. In the words of one senior Cambodian 
official, ‘Cambodia today has two laws, the law of the money and the law of the gun. If the 
leadership cannot buy you, they will shoot you’ (Brown/ McGrew 1995:145).”
Thus, the UN-sponsored multiparty elections ended up not in a liberal, pluralist, multiparty 
democracy, but in a coalition government of ‘monolithic’ appearance with a castrated national 
assembly (Curtis 1998:26). Being intolerant vis-à-vis political opposition, the government 
allocated the legislature a role subservient to the executive. The government leadership initi-
ated important legislation, and the executive dictated most of the assembly’s decisions 
(Brown/ Zasloff 1998:287). 
In contrast to the 1993 elections, the CPP won the second national elections in 1998 and en-
tered into another coalition with FUNCINPEC. Hun Sen became prime minister, Ranariddh 
spokesman of the national assembly. The first local elections were held in February 2002. Of 
the 1,621 communes, the CPP did win all except for 23. Local elections had been planned 
since 1995, but had been blocked by the CPP against the protests of FUNCINPEC, because 
the local level of government provided the CPP with a country-wide network of patronage. In 
addition, the Khmer Rouge dissolved, its leaders were imprisoned or they defected to Hun 
Sen. As a result, four factors contributed to the stabilisation of the political system: the clear 
victory of the CPP over FUNCINPEC, the power sharing agreement between CPP and FUN-
CINPEC on the local levels of government, the creation of the senate, and the dissolution of 
the Khmer Rouge. 
The third parliamentary elections in July 2003 were won by the CPP as well. However, it 
failed to achieve a two-thirds majority in order to rule alone (but to come closer to that goal, 
in early 2006 the CPP successfully pushed a vote through the National Assembly, which abol-
ished the two-thirds majority to form a government and replaced with a 50 plus 1 majority). 
This brought FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party, which came second after the CPP, to-
gether in a short-lived coalition for a better bargaining position against the CPP. The eventual 
agreement, however, was by and large one between Ranariddh and Hun Sen, while the Sam 
Rainsy Party was largely left out of the new arrangement. This led Sam Rainsy to call for a 
boycott of the new national assembly, which was constituted not before July 2004. Politics 
then continued largely as usual: in February 2005, Sam Rainsy left Cambodia after the par-
liament had stripped him of immunity due to defamation charges brought by the ruling coali-
tion. In December 2005, while being in exile in France, Sam Rainsy was convicted for defam-
ing Hun Sen and was sentenced to nine months in prison. A royal pardon by King Sihamoni 
received him in February 2006, providing for his return to Cambodia. It was only in May 
2006 that the Cambodian parliament voted to abolish prison terms for defamation. In October 
2006, FUNCINPEC dropped its long-term chairman Ranariddh over corruption charges. In 
addition, Hun Sen pushed an adultery law through the National Assembly with the aim to rid 
himself of Ranariddh. Ranariddh, in exile in France, then set about to form his own political 
party: the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP). The party contested in the commune council
elections of April 2007. On 24 April 2007, the National Election Committee published the 
official results: 
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Party Party personnel elected
Village Chiefs First Deputy 
Chiefs
Second Deputy 
Chiefs
Commune 
Council Mem-
bers
Total
CPP 1,591 1,125 185 5,092 7,993 (61%)
SRP 28 403 963 1,266 2,660 (25%)
FUNCINPEC 2 47 155 70 274 (5%)
NRP 0 46 317 62 425 (8%)
Hang Dara 
Democractic 
Movement 
Party57
0 1 0 0 1
Source: National Election Committee, 2007; number in percent from COMFREL, 2007a: 5+12. No percentage 
for Hang Dara given.
Despite the CPP showing its muscle to opposition politicians, the 2003 elections were rela-
tively peaceful with less intimidation than in 1998. One reason for this is that Hun Sen has 
noticed that the legitimacy of governments is a precondition for international integration and 
recognition.58 Thus, ‘CPP-instituted elements of surveillance, intimidation, and violence that 
effectively restrict competition by other political parties in rural Cambodia’ coexist with a 
shift ‘from the use of intimidation and violence to patronage politics in the form of material 
inducements such as individual gifts and construction projects’ (Un 2005:205). The Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights lists political killings and intimida-
tions. Among them are the murder of a FUNCINPEC candidate for commune chief and his 
wife in Kampot on 3 June 2000, in which the then commune chief was implicated; the killing 
of Sam Rainsy Party members in the provinces of Kampong Cham and Prey Veng; threats at 
gunpoint against a member of parliament of the Sam Rainsy Party by ‘a person in the uniform 
of a military officer’ owing to alleged defamation of the Investigation and Intelligence Unit of 
the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces; or the much discussed murder of trade union leader 
Chea Vichea on 22 January 2004 (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights 2001:10 and 2004:7-9). For the 2007 commune council elections, the Committee 
for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL) notes an 
“overall reduction in the number of killings, injuries and very serious election irregularities as 
compared with the 2002 local elections, but is very concerned that such incidents still persist, 
that requests and warnings by leaders to stop killing are not heeded, and that inadequate investi-
gation and lack of attention to due process foster a climate of impunity (COMFREL 2007a:6).”
Killings declined from eighteen cases in the 2002 commune council elections to nine killings 
in 2007. Of these nine cases during the preparatory period from 1 October 2006 to 30 April 
2007, six SRP activitst were killed, 2 CPP activists, and 1 NRP activist. Only the murderer of 
57 The Hang Dara Democratic Movement Party “was founded in May 2002 and is committed to the preserva-
tion of the monarchy, thwarting the threat posed by illegal immigrants, getting back all Cambodian land lost 
to neighboring countries and fighting corruption, said Teng Sokheng, party secretary-general” (Maloy/ Pin, 
2007). 
58 UN 2005:211+220; Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006:17.
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one of the SRP activists was found (COMFREL 2007a:6note3 and 9, 75-76). Yet, intimida-
tion and lethal as well as non-lethal violence were part of the campaign and electoral process, 
with the houses of SRP and NRP candidates set on fire in Banteay Meanchey and Kampong 
Chhnang provinces (SRP) and Pailin (NRP), or police telling an SRP candidate in Pursat 
province that his land dispute would be set aside if he stopped running for a council seat (all 
details in COMFREL 2007a:24-25).
Further, ‘serious election-related violations continued to persist and were observed to have 
escalated after the start of the official campaign period on March 16, 2007. A total of 333 
cases of irregularity were observed, mostly in Kampong Chhnang, Koh Kong, Preah Vihear, 
Kampong Cham, Kampot, Battambang and Ratanakiri, followed by Banteay Meanchey, Siem 
Reap and Kandal’ (COMFREL 2007a:6). The reason for this may be a change in political 
control from the CPP to other parties:
“although CPP took 98% of the commune chief positions, the few gains of the other parties ap-
pear to be clearly resented. It is too early to assess if new controlling elected Councilors are fac-
ing obstructions, although this is appearing to be the case, but more immediately deaths, at-
tempted killings, other serious crimes, and intimidation have all been reported where local elec-
torates may have been identified to have been disloyal to the CPP. At the time of writing, some 
CPP officials in those areas are also being replaced due to the poor results (COMFREL 
2007a:12).”
At the same time, the political space particularly for the SRP increased vis-à-vis the CPP, 
partly due to structural changes in the National Election Commission (NEC) (COMFREL 
2007a:9). Yet, COMFREL notes a political monopoly in 166 communes, in which the CPP 
took all the commune council seats, an increase from the the same situation in 148 communes 
in 2002 (COMFREL 2007a:5, 12). 
Simultaneously to the growth in political space, COMFREL notes increased media access for 
SRP and FUNCINPEC, and a higher number of women councillors (920 women or 8 percent
of 11,261 commune councilors in 2002, and 1,662 or 14.64 percent of the 11,353 commune 
councilors in 2007 are women) (COMFREL 2007a:5, 11-13, 73). 4 percent of commune chief 
positions are held by women, a gross disparity especially in rural areas, where ‘due to migra-
tion and past conflict, women form significantly larger majorities in electorates’ (COMFREL 
2007a:12).
On the whole, election victories are ensured mostly by nonviolent means. This is especially 
important for the cooptation of the rural electorate, which is influenced by the CPP control 
over television channels or the provisions of wells and other infrastructure. It is thus that the 
domination of the poltical system by the CPP rests upon adaptation of patronage politics to 
the needs of the political system: whereas the 1993 elections were still surrounded by armed 
attacks between FUNCINPEC and CPP, over time the CPP ‘grew accustomed to opposition 
parties’ and therefore changed strategies (Un 2005:210-212). 
A pattern has evolved as follows: first, the control of the television (newspapers hardly have 
circulation outside the urban centres) brings the CPP message to the rural electorate. This
goes along with the refusal to grant the Sam Rainsy Party radio broadcasting lincenses with 
which it could reach rural voters. In the coup of July 1997, FUNCINPEC’s media networks 
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were conveniently destroyed. The CPP does not control the newspapers, which are read 
mostly by the urban electorate, among which there are many critical of the government; sec-
ond, Hun Sen personally or CPP cadres continue the 1980s policy of ‘going down to the 
base’, where they talk to village residents about their needs for schools, wells, roads, temples 
or irrigation systems and ensure that these are being built with money Hun Sen derives from 
his business contacts (such as the mobile phone provider Mobitel and the oil company Soki-
mex, which also runs the Angkor complex). These contacts in addition strengthen Hun Sen’s 
individual support base within and outside the CPP. Thus, the link between CPP and business 
to deliver projects to the communes ensures a favourable electoral outcome rather than in-
timidation and political violence. Not voting for the CPP then, has negative consequences 
with a high ‘risk of exclusion’ if the gifts are refused and may result, for instance, in roads not 
being fixed.59
Voting for the CPP does not always do the trick, however: roadside interviews by the author 
on a rainly day in the town of Bovel in Battambang province in July 2007 showed angry 
townspeople, who complained that the government does nothing to repair the almost impass-
able, muddy and bumpy roads leading to and from the town, even though they vote CPP.60
Nevertheless, an active grassroot level and horizontal civil society networks are prevented in 
favour of a vertical cooptation of the electorate into ‘elite dominated trajectories’.61 Stability 
and peaceful elections have hence emerged as source of legitimacy for Hun Sen and the con-
tinuation of his rule. Importantly, this is also a function of social cohesion, whereby the state 
delivers goods through the application of clientelstic networks and under the condition that 
the clients join the ‘appropriate’ patronage networks. 
One important group in these patronage networks are the Pagoda Boys, a group loyal to Hun 
Sen, which is formally known as Pagoda Children, Intelligentsia and Student Association. 
The Pagoda Boys were employed in the 2003 Thai riots to exacerbate anti-Thai feelings in the 
preparation of national elections (Hinton 2006:451-452). Instigated demonstrations therefore 
seem to be an element of political conflict and resemble political practice under Sihanouk and 
Lon Nol, for instance, when both utilised anti-Vietnamese sentiment in the population to 
launch and seize on demonstrations against North Vietnam in 1970 prior to the Lon Nol’s 
coup against Sihanouk in the same year. 
3.2.2. Society
After the 1993 elections and the withdrawal of UNTAC, social recovery set in slowly given 
the division of the country in zones controlled by CPP, FUNCINPEC and the Khmer Rouge 
and the fighting between the factions. Drawing on existing socio-economic data in the mid-
1990s, UNICEF argued that the ‘demographic data provide a glaring reflection of the civil 
and political turmoil of the last 25 years’: given the high birth rate in the early 1980s, children 
aged below 15 make up 44 percent of the population of 10.2 million (the population estimate 
of 1993 was 9.3 million). In 1996, the birth rate was estimated at 44 per 1000. Infant mortality 
59 UN 2005:213-228, quotes at 221; Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003:4.
60 Interviews in Bovel, 15 July 2007.
61 UN 2005:223 cited Hughes 2003:126.
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was at 115 per 1000 (estimated) compared to 42 per 1000 in the rest of the Asia-Pacific and 
236 per 1000 at the end of the 1970s. The under-five mortality rate was at 181/1000, maternal 
mortality between 650 and 900 per 100,000 live births owing to ‘inadequate diet, poor water 
and sanitation and low quality medical care, exacerbated by civil war and land mines.’ Live 
expectancy was estimated at 51 years. One in 236 people had lost one or more limbs.62 ‘There 
was considerable rural to urban migration in the years immediately following the 1993 elec-
tions, as villagers searched for better employment opportunities in the largely urban private 
sector generated by the influx of international development assistance’ (UNICEF 1996:20). 
As for absolute numbers, quoting the Demographic Survey of 1996, Godfrey et. al. say that 
8.5 percent of the rural population or a total of ‘634,700 persons had moved from rural areas
within the five years prior to the Survey. Of these, 27 percent had moved within the previous 
12 months’ (Godfrey et. al. 2001:21). The 1998 Population Census mentions 881,400 persons 
who had moved from a rural area within the five years prior to the census, whereby 31 percent
had moved within the previous twelve months. The surveys thus show a two-year increase of 
39 percent for all migrants, and of 59 percent for migrants who had moved within the twelve 
months before the surveys (Godfrey et. al. 2001:21).
The reasons for migration are as follows: 
Source: Source: National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning: 1998 Population Census. 
http://statsnis.org/CENSUSES/Census1998/miggraph.htm. 
62 UNICEF 1996:19-20; Royal Government of Cambodia 1996:5.
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The reasons for the high number of migrating people are produced by: 
“rapid population growth through the 1980s and 1990s (population has doubled in two decades, 
meaning that many later entrants in the working age groups would not have land), emergence of 
active land markets and commercialization of part of the farming activities (implying exchange 
and/or reallocation of land), and rising aspirations of particularly the younger generation popu-
lation – largely fuelled by the spread of non-farm activities during the 1990s.”63
The following table shows migration numbers within and between provinces: 
Code Province
Number of
Migrants
As % of
Population
Percentage of Migrants
Within same
Province
From another
Province
From outside
Cambodia
Cambodia 3,597,774 31.5 58.8 35.3 5.9
01 Banteay Mean Chey 192,714 33.4 50.5 36.1 13.4
02 Bat Dambang 312,350 39.4 65.9 22.1 12.0
03 Kampong Cham 386,675 24.0 70.4 28.4 1.2
04 Kampong Chhnang 194,731 46.6 78.5 16.7 4.8
05 Kampong Spueu 149,453 25.0 74.6 23.9 1.5
06 Kampong Thum 101,961 17.9 82.5 16.6 0.9
07 Kampot 95,909 18.2 79.1 18.4 2.5
08 Kandal 306,891 28.5 51.8 41.5 6.7
09 Kaoh Kong 76,591 58.0 19.7 75.0 5.3
10 Kracheh 52,868 20.1 53.8 42.8 3.4
11 Mondol Kiri 14,821 45.7 59.8 33.4 6.8
12 Phnom Penh 733,745 73.4 40.6 53.9 5.5
63 Acharya 2001:5 cited Sok and Acharya 2002.
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13 Preah Vihear 24,456 20.5 66.7 31.8 1.5
14 Prey Veaeng 170,849 18.1 78.6 17.0 4.4
15 Pousat 147,956 41.0 76.0 18.4 5.6
16 Rotanak Kiri 18,956 20.1 49.8 46.3 3.9
17 Siem Reab 188,415 27.1 82.7 14.1 3.2
18 Krong Preah Sihanouk 81,249 52.2 27.5 68.7 3.8
19 Stueng Traeng 15,716 19.4 36.2 58.0 5.8
20 Svay Rieng 164,430 34.4 32.1 57.7 10.2
21 Takaev 115,003 14.6 73.0 19.7 7.3
22 Otdar Mean Chey 26,413 38.7 38.7 42.3 19.0
23 Krong Kaeb 7,887 27.5 9.6 89.1 1.3
24 Krong Pailin 17,735 77.4 19.4 68.5 12.1
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning: 1998 Population Census. 
http://statsnis.org/CENSUSES/Census1998/migration.htm. 
Among the migrants, youth (aged 15 to 24 years) constituted 18 percent of the total popula-
tion and 30 percent of the ‘very recent’ migrant flows in the twelve months prior to the 1998 
survey. Young adults (aged 25-29 years) make up less than 8 percent of the total population 
but 13 percent of migrants. Children under five years (‘presumably moving with their par-
ents’), make up 9 percent of the migrants (Godfrey et. al. 2001:23). 
Salaries in the civil service were (and still are) so low that government employees need to 
supplement their income with other activities. In the first half of the 1990s, teacher salaries 
were increased from 8 US Dollar to 15 US Dollar a month (UNICEF 1996:22+120). The 
situation is the same today as teachers (their current salaries are at 45 US Dollars per month) 
and civil service employees need to supplement their income through corruption, by asking 
students to pay in order to continue to receive lessons in the second half of the months (which
affects students from poor families), or by driving motorcycle taxi. 
UNICEF also mentions the overstaffing of the government bureaucracy at all levels of gov-
ernment, which employs an estimate of 290,000 people: ‘the present civil service is not struc-
tured to offer career development since clear job descriptions and graded wage scales are 
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lacking. In the past, most government workers had to add political skills to other factors in 
order to rise in the system. At all levels most workers lack basic equipment and supplies to 
perform their duties. The number of civil servants also includes approximately 148,000 per-
sonnel of the military and security services. An unsually high proportion (68 per cent) of the 
Cambodian military is made up of officers. Under the former socialist government, as many 
people as possible were given government jobs. Up to 1995, all graduates of universities were 
guaranteed a job in government; this is no longer possible’ (UNICEF 1996:22). 
Apparently, by 2006 the situation had taken dimensions which led the government in a des-
perate move to introduce a military service law, which would draw 300,000 people entering 
the labour market into the military (BBC 25 October 2006). How this can be sustained finan-
cially is entirely unclear, however, and did not play any role in the decision-making processes 
at all.64 The situation reverberates with the late Sihanouk years when university graduates 
were unable to find employment commensurate with their education.
UNICEF further reported that 24 percent of households in Phnom Penh and 40 percent of ru-
ral households were below the poverty line in 1996: ‘With 85 per cent of Cambodia’s popula-
tion living in rural areas, the poverty line calculations show that 90 per cent of Cambodia’s 
poverty is rural’ (UNICEF 1996:28-29). To supplement their income, farmers also work as 
‘labourers, market sellers, small shopkeepers, mechanics and artisans’ (UNICEF 1996:31) – a 
situation that has not changed to the present day. Then as today, in the absence of social bene-
fit systems, poverty makes access to resources difficult if not impossible as the access to the 
resource itself and its quality is linked to wealth and connection to patronage networks. Con-
versations in July 2007 with Cambodian university students in Phnom Penh aged 24 whose 
parents are farmers in Prey Veng province strongly show the difficulty of accessing resources
such as education and health care, which often makes it necessary to sell land in order to use 
the money gained for paying medical expenses. Terrified of expensive hospital fees, some do 
not dare to go to medical checkups at all. Without sufficient funds available, therefore, neither 
education nor adequate health care can be obtained in Cambodia 14 years after the withdrawal 
of UNTAC.65
Clientelistic networks also apply to access to land. The prime difficulty here is that land own-
ers and the legal status of land frequently changed due to the civil war and the various re-
gimes:
“Land distribution in the late 1980s was partly a de facto recognition of lands that people al-
ready controlled under the krom samaki system, though fresh lands were also distributed. The 
country had just emerged from a decade and a half of different forms of collective and co-
operative agriculture, and the concept of private property was not uniformly recognised or prac-
tised, by either the populace or the administration. Thus, while lands were distributed and pri-
vate ownership of plots recognised, no clear demarcation of each plot was officially made. The 
authorities were plainly not equipped for this, and farmers were not concerned, because all 
knew their neighbours and boundaries. Also, most farmers and village communities are not very 
64 Interview with an advisor to the National Assembly, Phnom Penh, 31 May 2007.
65 Interviews held in Phnom Penh during July 2007. 
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literate and were not exposed to legal practices. Hence, they preferred to control their lands 
through traditional systems and did not care for official papers (Chan Sophal/ Tep Saravy/ 
Sarthi Acharya 2001:27).”
Consequently, land disputes, land grabbing and unlawful evictions are frequent, using the 
lawless character that surrounds titles to land. As the traditional means of acquiring land was 
by using it productively, today a ‘majority of people believe that if they are occupying land 
without conflict or controversy it is legally theirs, irrespective of whether they formally pos-
sess land papers.’ Today, administrative procedures penetrate the village as an applicant for a 
land title has to submit the application to the commune chief who certifies it and farwards it to
the District Office of Land Management, Urban Planning, Construction and Land Titling
(Chan Sophal/ Tep Saravy/ Sarthi Acharya 2001:ii+1+27). Non-violent resistance by commu-
nities to avoid the grabbing of community forests, fisheries and land by powerful agencies do 
exist: in December 2003, a demonstration of a national coalition of communities in front of 
the National Assembly was violently suppressed. In addition, thousands of minority villagers 
in the North-eastern areas face growing pressure to sell their ancestral lands. High-ranking 
military officers have confiscated lands from members of ethnic minorities. In Ratanakiri, a 
military officer and his intermediaries were involved in fraud and forgery of official docu-
ments with the aim to buy land from ethnic minorities in Bokeo district. The involved inter-
ests include logging concessions, which in the case of Ronteah village in Tumring commune 
of Sandan district in the province of Kampong Thom were granted to Colexim, GAT and 
Mieng Ly Heang, all linked to high-ranking government officials; and Tumring Rubber Plan-
tation, which has connections to the Tumring Communal Administrative Police. In 2004, the 
number of land disputes was three times that of 2003. So far, an inefficient, corrupt and CPP-
controlled judiciary has not been able to clarify the situation. Incidents were also reported in 
the provinces of Pursat and Kampong Chhnang against the planting of eucalyptus trees by 
Pheapimex which was followed by a grenade attack on the protesting villagers on 13 Novem-
ber 2004; violence and harassment against villagers by soldiers in Snuol district of Kratie 
province in November and December 2004; or arrests of villagers in Battambang province in 
late 2004 following villagers’ harvesting of the rice on the land they had occupied since the 
1980s but which was taken by soldiers in the late 1990s and sold to new owners.66
66 Keng Menglang 2003:24-25; Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003:8 and 2006:6+10; Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2001:23 and 2004:15-16.
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Source: Save Cambodia’s Wildlife, 2006: 49.
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Source: Save Cambodia’s Wildlife, 2006: 43. 
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Source: Save Cambodia’s Wildlife, 2006: 41.
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In the mid-1990s, UNICEF reported that the opening of the border to legal as well as illegal 
trade had depleted much of the forest in the six provinces of Kampong Chhnang, Kampong 
Speu, Kandal, Prey Veng, Takeo and Svay Rieng. While the organisation stated that the ef-
fects of this are still unclear, the immediately concrete result was that ‘women and children in 
these provinces now spend more time on collecting and carrying firewood, which is becoming 
increasingly scarce’ (UNICEF 1996:18). This initial statement by UNICEF on the wholesale 
exploitation of resources by commercial and political interests without regard for the needs of 
the poor and vulnerable has now grown into an all out war between the Cambodian govern-
ment and the British NGO Global Witness. Forced to close down its Cambodia office in 2005, 
Global Witness again published a report in June 2007, entitled Cambodia’s Family Trees,
which links the government to illegal logging, calling it a ‘cleptocratic elite’ (Global Witness
2007). Deeply despised by Hun Sen, the prime minister ordered to confiscate all hard copies 
of the report.
Consequently, national law and judiciary are seen by the poor as catering to the rich, due to 
the ‘direct or indirect involvement of or inaction by the police in many of the reported cases. 
[…] corruption is widespread in the judicial system; perpetrators can buy justice, and police 
and court officials often broker deals between victims and perpetrators while keeping for 
themselves a share of the compensation. […] judicial independence […] is threatened mainly 
by direct and indirect interference by the executive and powerful private entities [… and] by 
the affiliation of judges and prosecutors with political parties’ (Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 2001:11-12 and 2004:7-8). In 2003, Hun Sen’s 
nephew Nhim Sophea was acquitted from charges of voluntary manslaughter, confirming to 
the population that the rich and powerful can evade punishment when they belong to protec-
tive social networks, or khsae.67 In the case of a village in Kampong Speu province, soldiers 
started fencing acres. Complaints of the village chief to the provincial court ended up in the 
court saying that it ‘could do nothing to help’:
“land, having hitherto been almost worthless, is now a fast-appreciating asset. Almost any 
Cambodian with a bit of spare cash is taking a speculating punt, snapping up a chunk of land in 
the hope of easy profits. Small farmers, and poor people living in shacks in the towns and cities, 
usually have no proof that they own their land or homes. This makes it easy for the speculators 
– often politicians, civil servants or army brass – to work the corrupt legal system to take the 
ground from under their feet (The Economist 10 March 2007:38).”
As a result, ‘the ill-educated are usually defeated by the well-connected rich in any legal bat-
tle’ (The Economist 10 March 2007:38). According to the UN Commission on Human Rights, 
human rights violations over the last decade ‘have often not been carried out at the direct be-
hest of key power holders, but […] they have been condoned to maintain vested interest’, en-
suring impunity for the armed forces and police. This includes attacks on members of the ju-
diciary (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2004:8). A 
summary of proceedings of negotiations between residents of the small island of Koh Pich at 
Sangkat Tonle Bassac in Phnom Penh and the Deputy Governor of Phnom Penh, Pa Socheat-
67 Kent 2006:348; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2004:10.
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vong, shows the struggle between residents facing evictions and the business interests of the 
municipal authorities. The local authorities leased the island to Overseas Cambodian Invest-
ment, a parent company of Canadia Bank, in order to turn it into a satellite city complete with 
tourism areas, a hospital, a shopping mall, villas, flats, hotels, schools, offices and a 222-
meter high observation tower. In 2004, local officials and 7NG Company started to evict resi-
dents from their land. Residents, helped by the USAID-funded Public Interest Legal Advo-
cacy Project (PILAP), took the matter to the municipal court. PILAP, according to its report 
on the issue, was able to extract a reasonable compensation package amidst attempts by the 
authorities to influence the court’s decision, to intimidate the island’s residents, mostly farm-
ers, compensate them with 2 US Dollar per square metre, and resettle them outside the city 
away from their farmland.68
The pressure of sometimes uncontrolled market forces, which we already saw in Chapter 1
with the intrusion of a cash crop economy into subsistence villages under Sihanouk is further
increased, either in a legal fashion of genuine well-intended government poverty reduction 
plans, or illegal and uncontrolled driven by corruption. With increased capitalist penetration 
of the village, Krishnamurthy in his 1999 study of two villages notes that the already men-
tioned informal cooperative work groups (provas dei) are now ‘giving way to new networks 
based on rigid reciprocity and the need to earn cash income.’ Although the willingness to help 
prevailed, as can be seen in the revival of the cooperative work groups, the decline of the in-
formal cooperation networks is owing to ‘the emergence of a cash economy, the desire to ac-
quire wealth and to the pressures of making a living that force people to worry about their 
own problems and needs first’.69 As Hughes argues, the capitalist penetration of villages is the 
declared aim of the government in order to develop local economies and reduce poverty. This 
is likely to challenge the immaterial social and cultural capital invested in by village authori-
ties to determine their status and repute within villages: ‘material capital becomes more im-
portant’ and ‘previously free resources’ such as forests and ponds and speculation on the price 
of land may increase inequalities and change intra-village relationships, definitions of status 
and relations between the village and the higher levels of government. This then also impacts 
on the conflict management capacities of the traditional village authorities: village leader and 
monks: ‘The impersonality of capitalist relations contrasts with the highly personal nature of a 
social control achieved through the valorisation of particular conceptions of a “good name.” 
In the money economy, symbolic capital loses its power, and consequently the restraints on 
behaviour associated with investment in symbolic capital lose force also’ (Hughes 
2001:23+24). As a result, the ‘social give-and-take, determined by traditional conceptions of 
obligation and good will, are replaced by the inflexibility of codified laws backed by imper-
sonal force’.70
Hughes also notes that in addition to the monetisation of relationships in the village, there are 
attempts to revive Buddhist ideals in social relations: a ‘reputation for living in accordance 
with Buddhist values and practices is likely to contribute to an individual’s store of symbolic 
68 Rasmei Kampuchea Daily 21 October 2005; People’s Daily 13 January 2006; USAID November 2005.
69 Hughes 2001:22 cited Krishnamurthy 1999:62.
70 Hughes 2001:23 cited Wolf 1971:283.
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capital in the village. This appears to be important in identifying potential conflict managers 
from among the village population’ – while, however, villagers may also choose a person for 
their strength. ‘The different kinds of qualities that are respected in different kinds of people 
are important for determining how relationships between people contribute to strategies for 
pursuing and managing conflict’ (Hughes 2001:13-14). And further: the ‘drive to bring Bud-
dhist texts into everyday use represents an attempt to bring the norms of the pagoda into the 
secular life of the village, and by doing so, to alter the understandings of villagers of appro-
priate values and behaviour. The emphasis on the peaceful aspects of Buddhist teachings en-
courages villagers to give greater respect to these norms, and less respect to individuals who 
use violence or threats’ (Hughes 2001:15). 
Overall, social integration has remained low, as political participation has been kept low 
within Hughes’s above-mentioned ‘elite dominated trajectories.’ Civic self-organisation in 
labour unions, human rights organisations and other NGOs has limited influence and a public 
voice on the national level through strikes and rallies in the cities, where opposition to Hun 
Sen accumulates; but civic self-organisation is often absent in the rural areas. It thus happens 
that subsistance rice farmers, who make up aroung 80 percent of Cambodia’s population, re-
main poorly represented (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006:6). This fact is favourable 
for the election outcomes of the CPP given the differences in voting behaviour among the 
urban and rural electorates (Un 2005:212-217). Access to welfare (such as health care, dis-
ability services, old age support) and access to education are ‘segemented in terms of territory 
and social stratum’ with many elderly of 55 and older relying on their children for a living. 
Government spending in the social sector is tiny and dependent on the donor community 
while spending on the defence and interior is ample: in 2003, donors provided 35 million US 
Dollar for budget support, more than 50 percent of which was used to cover salaries for the 
armed forces. International assistance covered 52 percent of the budget of all basic public 
services in 2002 and 50 percent in 2004 (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006:6+10-
11+14). 
4. Conclusion and Summary: Legitimacy of Violence and Legitimacy of 
Rule
When glowing through Cambodia’s history since 1954, recurring forms of violence can be 
observed, which can be attributed to different actors in order to judge when violence was 
used, how and why:
The first feature is violence executed by the government: violence here was used in a con-
trolled manner and used in instances when political opposition had to be crushed or intimi-
dated. The public beating of Democratic Party members outside the Palace compounds in 
1957 is one example of this. On the local level, intimidation of Pracheachon and Democratic 
Party candidates to relinquish their candidacy is another example. This also served as a warn-
ing against students and intellectuals, who were the support base of the Democratic Party and 
frequently demonstrated against the corruption and nepotism of Sihanouk’s regime. The re-
sources for this consisted in the control over the security forces: the Palace Guard, police, 
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secret service, and army. The army leadership around Lon Nol was especially influential as it 
was seen and saw itself as guarantor of the security of the newly independent Cambodia and 
therefore enjoyed a high standing and high funding, particularly through US aid. 
Violence here was carried out under the rationale of saving the state from its enemies as de-
fined by both Sihanouk and the army leadership. These included public humiliation and in-
timidation, such as those of Democratic Party members, politically motivated killings, arrests 
without trials, censorship of alleged or real leftist newspapers, and absolute control over the 
media and the security forces ‘to cow people into inaction’ (Chandler 1991:81-84, 90-98). 
Violence was used to crush the communist resistance in the countryside and provoked the 
rationale for more violence by the targets (real or alleged communists, peasants, and urban 
escapees) against government forces. 
The formal political legitimacy for these actions stemmed from the electorate, which gave the 
Sangkum control over the National Assembly and Sihanouk and Lon Nol the formal legiti-
macy to deploy armed forces when deemed necessary. Actual legitimacy however resulted 
from access to relevant resources: government positions gained through political reliability 
and clan networks rather than technocratic competence, and economic resources controlled 
through clientelistic networks (cronyism) of the political elite.
Mob violence is also an issue to receive legitimacy for actions. The crowd attacking the North 
Vietnamese embassy in 1970 was first orchestrated by Sihanouk, but then seized on by Lon 
Nol. Mob violence instigated by the authorities is also an issue in today’s Cambodia. In 2004, 
the UN Commission on Human Rights reported the killing of 26 persons by mobs in 2004 
while the Director-General of the National Police reported 30 killings. ‘In a number of cases, 
law enforcement officials have instigated crowds to attack individuals suspected of theft or 
robbery’ (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2004:8 and 
2001:11). 
Under Hun Sen, state violence served to preserve CPP dominance in the post-UNTAC polity. 
Apart from political killings, mob violence is again a feature of this: Hun Sen employs youth 
associations loyal to him, among which the most prominent are the aforementioned Pagoda 
Boys. Access to resources is controlled through a patronage network, which centers on Hun 
Sen’s extended family. Ultimately, this results in the unity of economic and political power, 
which allows for the control over a large portion especially of the rural population, as political 
and economic patronage strings link persons of political and economic power, with Hun Sen 
and the business elite on top, linked in a network of mutual give and take.
The first attempt at the establishment of a parliamentary democracy modelled on the French 
tradition failed when Sihanouk wiped out the Democratic Party in the aftermath of the 1955 
elections and established himself as paramount ruler and divine figure. With every new sys-
tem of government, a set of patrons controlled resources within a changed economic envi-
ronment. As Thion described the changes from Sihanouk to Lon Nol, he argued that: ‘con-
tending politicians appeared typically as patrons commanding a more or less important retinue 
of clients whom they had to pay off with gifts and posts. They had to control resources and 
redistribute wealth as a means of keeping and enlarging their crowd of clients. These re-
sources could come from illegal business through Chinese middlemen, gross corruption or
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foreign help. The pattern [of the Lon Nol years] did not look very different from that of the 
old days; only the economic opportunities and environment had changed’ (Thion 1987:154). 
The same pattern was laid bare in the conflict between FUNCINPEC and CPP over the allo-
cation of local government posts and the creation of a senate as second chamber of the par-
liament after the second election in 1998. The difference was that the political actors, the in-
ternational environment with its politicised aid and military supplies, and the domestic institu-
tional set up had changed. The international dimension is of particular importance given the 
reliance of the Cambodian army of various regimes on outside military aid. This shifted in 
times from the United States to China, (North) Vietnam and the Soviet Union, while aid was 
channelled to the preferred Cambodian political party or resistance group. 
Violence was a means to push through the authority of a single person (Sihanouk, Pol Pot, 
Hun Sen) or a particular party attached to a particular mode of governance (the Sangkum, the 
communist party, the KPRP, or the CPP). Violence was carried out through complete control 
over the security apparatus of police and army with the aim to quell resistance, legal as well 
as illegal opposition, and to scare official parliamentary candidates into silence. 
The second feature is violence executed by communist revolutionaries who had been driven 
underground in the 1960s, depriving them of legal ways for political participation. Overall it 
can be seen as a reaction to increased suppression by Sihanouk and Lon Nol, particularly 
since the Samlot rebellion of 1967. In the 1970s, with the Pol Pot faction on the ascendance, 
this combined with two elements: anti-Vietnamese feelings and an increased nationalism cou-
pled with the idea of self-reliance, which were probed in the Democratic Revolution carried 
out after 1973 in the areas taken from Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic. The ideological rationale 
came from class analysis, which saw Cambodia as feudal and semi-colonial country. The 
support base were mainly poor peasants, which were given land and positions of responsibil-
ity in parts of the zones of influence established in the countryside between 1970 and 1975. 
This latter action replaced the old system of village administration with persons of political 
reliability instead of repute and Buddhist knowledge (Kiernan 1986:317-318). After 1975, 
this was channelled into state policies of Democratic Kampuchea. 
Revolutionary violence took on a multitude of forms: it was used to kill old rivals and settle 
private feuds, that is, revolutionary violence was a pretext to get rid of people of personal dis-
likes, such as neighbours. Revolutionary violence was further used to dispose of political 
enemies. These were intra-party rivals, recalcitrant peasants refusing collectivisation, village 
chiefs and local government officials, Vietnamese communist troops and advisors, returning 
Khmer communists trained in Vietnam, or members of the Vietnamese minority. Anti-
Vietnamese feelings were stirred or used to achieve political goals. Kiernan notes that anti-
Vietnamese feelings had been stirred by Lon Nol in his position both as army commander and 
prime minister since the late 1960s. Coercion, intimidation, and assassination (Kiernan 
1986:322) were thus employed to carry out the revolution. 
Conflict regulation was often based on informal networks rather than on official ways through 
the judiciary. On the village level during Sihanouk times, conflict and violence were con-
trolled by social integration of children (mostly young boys) through the local pagoda. A link 
between politics (Sihanouk as the protector of the sangha and the poor) and village support 
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for the religious and non-religious services of monks exercised control over political opinions 
among the peasantry until Sihanouk lost his unifying grip on politics in 1967, when the Sam-
lot rebellion spread through Cambodia, partly stirred by communists, partly a reaction to the 
capitalist penetration of the subsistence village economy, partly a reaction to increased gov-
ernmental suppression. 
Conflict management in the village was through three trajectories: the secular authority of the 
village chief (which could link up to the formal procedures of national law), the religious au-
thority of the pagoda, and community pressure of gossip and ostracism. Today, the village 
chief still occupies the prime role is settling disputes. Cases are referred to law courts only 
when it is deemed necessary given the gravity of a particular case. Other than that, residents 
prefer the informal mediation of a conflict by the village chief. In some cases, monks are 
sought to give advice. The reason for this is mostly mistrust towards the state and its authori-
ties, which came to increasingly penetrate formerly self-sufficient villages.
On a larger basis, the judiciary is regarded as a tool in the hands of the political elite. Corrupt 
judges are seen to preserve the privileges of the rich against the poor in cases of land con-
flicts, or alternatively the power of Hun Sen by fabricating indictments against political oppo-
nents. The defamation law had long been used for the latter purpose and regularly led Sam 
Rainsy and Ranariddh to leave the country to escape judicial proceedings. The passing of the 
adultery law is a case, in which Hun Sen used the National Assembly as legislature to termi-
nate political activities of Ranariddh, given that the adultery law enabled Hun Sen – if not him 
personally – to file a suit against Ranariddh for having committed adultery. 
So on surface, not much has changed in Cambodia since 1954: corruption and patronage kept 
material and immaterial resources in the hands of a small elite – under Sihanouk, Lon Nol, 
Pol Pot, Heng Samrin and Hun Sen; the health system was never expanded into remote areas; 
political activism was tightly controlled since Sihanouk times; the security forces served the 
goals of a small political elite; censorship and politically motivated murders kept oppositions 
at bay; National Assembly members were threatened into acquiescence or had to flee the 
country. Systems of patronage and nepotism were employed even during the Pol Pot years 
catering to the political needs of the new leadership, then changed to cater to Heng Samrin 
and Hun Sen’s regime, and after 1993 were reorganised within the democratic institutions of 
the post-UNTAC period to ensure the survival of Hun Sen’s political authority. Violence or-
chestrated by the government using strict control over the security forces as source of author-
ity accompanied all political regimes from the early days of Sihanouk to today’s Hun Sen 
government. For the clients, then, systems of patronage served social needs within a ‘loosely 
structured’ society in which political integration was largely absent since the ‘presence of the 
state was far from being felt everywhere’ (Thion 1987:163). To some extent, the lack of a 
country-wide education and health system has retained the pattern of the distant state and 
opens the way for corruption in both systems when teachers and physicians ask for money in 
order to provide services in rural (but also urban) areas.
During the Sihanouk years, without idealising the situation, it can be said that overall a com-
bination of religious and clan-based networks kept social cohesion in the village strong. These 
relationships were both vertical and horizontal. For instance, they were vertical between 
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monks and the villagers or between the village leaders and the villagers; they were horizontal 
through the cooperative work teams. Community mechanisms of social control were em-
ployed to prevent or manage conflicts. The pagoda exercised social control through the cos-
mology of Theravada Buddhism and by offering services to the community, while the village 
leader represented the secular authorities of the state and referred conflicts up the administra-
tive ladder when necessary. Over all of this presided the king, performing his role as protector 
of the poor and of the sangha. 
In the cities, especially in Phnom Penh, Sihanouk’s influence eroded amidst the beginnings of 
globalisation via France. The cosmology of Sihanouk’s reign was rejected by intellectuals and 
students. Policies such as Buddhist socialism did not help them finding employment commen-
surate with their education. Consequently, urban and rural areas had different points of identi-
fication and pursued different ideas of political legitimacy. Phnom Penh today is still the cen-
tre of student opposition to Prime Minister Hun Sen, while he controls the rural areas. In that 
sense, we can observe a continuity of urban opposition to authoritarian rule and at the same 
time control over the rural majority areas by the governing party within a system of formal 
democracy.
Epilogue: Youth Violence in Post-war Cambodia
As the study suggests, the political space in Cambodia since 1993 is occupied by contending 
patronage networks affiliated with the political parties, of which the CPP is dominant: it holds 
control of most communes, has more space to manoeuvre for the formation of future govern-
ments since the abolishment of the two-thirds majority necessary for the formation of a gov-
ernment, and it controls the security forces. 
With no lobby of their own, youth are caught in this political space as both victims and perpe-
trators of violence: as instruments and extensions of political parties, active executioners of 
violent acts on their own account, actively sought after victims or simple casualties of a po-
litical, social and economic development, which provides education, employment and health 
care for those in advantageous networks of patronage, but casts away those in less influential 
patronage networks. The disinterestedness of (male) youth in elections is a symptom of the 
disenfranchisement of youth from the political process and a reaction to the neglect of their 
group by political decision makers.
Post-war Cambodia has seen different life worlds for youth, depending on whether they lived 
in the capital, areas of less war activity or areas with major war activity. These life worlds 
were created through the externally induced triple transformation process of post-war pacifi-
cation, democratisation and economic liberalisation. This process met domestic settings of 
political tradition, conflict settlement, economic activity, and social cohesion and integration. 
We have thus a dual and at the same time dualistic process of external and internal dynamics, 
which produced an area of conflict between tradition and modernity, political contests and 
economic and social upheaval, in which youth are often overlooked by the political players 
and in which they henceforth struggle to find a niche for themselves. 
In the post-war context, youth violence can be seen as a response and consequence of three 
developments: rapid social change (urbanisation, migration, globalisation, change in agrarian 
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property and land use structures), war and war-related violence (disruption of traditional fam-
ily networks, a culture of distrust and fear, destruction of social and economic infrastructure 
fundamental for children and youth development - mostly education and health), and the triple 
transformation process, during which Cambodia saw an authoritarian reconstruction of poli-
tics and society under CPP dominance, international pressure for democratisation, and a sur-
vival of war economy structures. 
In this social reality of post-war life worlds, gangs are formed or youth join gangs as surro-
gate family when the actual family is decimated or disrupted through flight and intra-familiar 
violence. Yet, youth groups are also formed by political parties for regime support or as a 
challenge to it. Youth violence is therefore executed by youth, whereby the rich are protected 
from prosecution by influential patronage networks into the CPP; and youth violence is gen-
erated by political parties for peaceful protests or to escalate conflicts in their favour. 
Importantly, therefore, youth violence is often controlled at the political level. The political 
system has the ability to exacerbate youth violence, or to reduce it depending on the political 
agenda. The second Cambodia study will discuss these issues in detail.
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